Alsaifi v Secretary of State for Education

In a defamation claim concerning a regulator’s press statement about an unsuccessful appeal, the court held that the statement had to be read in the context of the article as a whole. A source is not liable for defamatory meaning created by inaccurate, misleading or additional material supplied by the publisher, provided the source material itself is not defamatory in context. An expression of disappointment with a judgment did not amount to an assertion that the judgment was wrong or that the claimant remained guilty of the underlying conduct. The claimant also failed to establish serious harm under section 1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013. The regulator’s response to judicial criticism and public concern about the regulation of teachers was protected by qualified privilege.

The claimant brought a defamation claim against the Secretary of State for Education concerning four sentences attributed to a spokesperson of the National College for Teaching and Leadership and published online by The Chronicle. The statement expressed disappointment with the High Court’s judgment, reaffirmed the regulator’s commitment to high standards of conduct, and defended its policies and procedures.

The claimant contended that the words suggested that his conduct justified a teaching ban and that the High Court had been wrong to set the ban aside. The issues agreed for trial were meaning, serious harm and qualified privilege. The court also considered the context of the article and the distinction between the source’s words and material supplied by the publisher.

1. Meaning. The words were incapable of bearing a defamatory meaning referring to the claimant. The first sentence referred to disappointment with the High Court’s judgment and the outcome of the case, rather than asserting that the court was wrong or that the claimant remained guilty of the underlying conduct. The remaining sentences were general observations about regulatory policy and procedures and were not directed at him.
2. Meaning had to be assessed in the context of the article as a whole. A source’s press statement could not be artificially isolated from that context. Conversely, the source was not responsible for inaccuracy, spin or additional material supplied by the publisher which altered the meaning of the source material. The source was entitled to assume that the material would appear in a fair and accurate account.
3. The suggested meaning relating to children under sixteen was highly strained. The article’s references to a college, lecturer, student and part-time study indicated further education rather than compulsory school education.
4. Serious harm. Although it was unnecessary to decide the issue after the finding on meaning, the claimant had not satisfied section 1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013. The words did not affect his reputation. Any reputational harm arose from the publicity given to the underlying allegations and earlier findings, rather than from the four sentences complained of.
5. Qualified privilege. The defence succeeded. The regulator had a duty and interest in explaining its policies and responding to judicial criticism concerning the regulation of teachers. The media and the public had a corresponding interest in receiving that response. The publication was a reasonable response to a legitimate press enquiry and there was no pleaded or established malice or recklessness sufficient to defeat the privilege.
6. The claimant’s claim was dismissed because the words were incapable of bearing a defamatory meaning, the serious-harm threshold was not met, and qualified privilege was established.

The judgment describes earlier High Court proceedings concerning the claimant’s professional conduct and related defamation claims, including [2016] EWHC 1591, [2017] EWHC 1444 and [2017] EWHC 2873. Those decisions formed part of the factual and procedural background; this was a first-instance determination of the present claim.