Emambee v London Borough of Islington

For an appeal under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996, notification ordinarily occurs when the decision is delivered to the address notified by the applicant, rather than when the applicant actually reads it. The court must be satisfied that the appeal was brought within 21 days; uncertainty about the delivery date is insufficient. Permission to appeal out of time requires a good reason for both the failure to appeal in time and any delay in seeking permission. The merits of the proposed appeal are irrelevant to that assessment. Whether there is good reason is fact-sensitive. The court must examine all the circumstances, including the conduct and circumstances of the applicant and any representatives.

The claimant appealed against an order of Judge Hellman in the Central London County Court dated 26 April 2019. The judge refused permission to appeal out of time under section 204(2A) of the Housing Act 1996 and dismissed the appeal.

The underlying dispute concerned the termination of temporary accommodation after the local authority concluded that the claimant was not residing there. The review decision was posted to an address nominated by the claimant. The central issues were whether the appeal had been brought within 21 days of notification and, if not, whether the claimant had shown a good reason for the delay.

1. Appeal dismissed. The High Court upheld the decision that the statutory 21-day period had not been shown to have been met and that there was no good reason for the delay.
2. Notification under section 204(2) meant delivery of the decision to the premises notified by the claimant, rather than actual receipt or the date on which the claimant became aware of the letter. That finding was not challenged. The first-instance judge was entitled to conclude that the letter might have been delivered before 28 December 2018 and that the evidence did not satisfy him that the appeal was in time.
3. The court distinguished between being unsatisfied that an appeal was out of time and being satisfied that it was brought within time. Section 204 required the latter. The possibility that Christmas post had been delayed did not establish compliance.
4. In exercising the discretion under section 204(2A)(b), the court must assess whether there was a good reason for the failure to appeal in time and for any delay in seeking permission. The merits of the proposed appeal do not form part of that assessment. There are no fixed rules on the responsibility of a litigant for a representative’s error or on the relevance of lack of representation. The particular facts and evidence must be examined.
5. The first-instance judge had considered the claimant’s dyslexia, her previous ability to obtain assistance, the period between receipt of the decision and consultation with solicitors, and the possibility of prompt filing after consultation. He was entitled, and on the evidence bound, to conclude that dyslexia did not explain the relevant delay. The fact that the proposed appeal was properly arguable and had a real prospect of success could not alter that conclusion.

• High Court (Queen’s Bench Division): appeal from the order of HHJ Hellman in the Central London County Court dated 26 April 2019. Permission to appeal was granted on 31 July 2019. The appeal was dismissed.