London Borough of Tower Hamlets v Al Ahmed

When deciding whether to extend the statutory time limit for a homelessness appeal, the court must examine all the circumstances and ask whether there was a good reason for the failure to bring the appeal in time. The merits of the proposed appeal are irrelevant. Lack of legal representation, reliance on a charity to find a lawyer, difficulty in understanding the procedure, and pending legal-aid arrangements do not automatically constitute good reason. Their significance depends on the evidence and circumstances of the particular case. Legal-aid-related costs exposure may be considered, but is not decisive.

The respondent sought to challenge a homelessness review decision under the Housing Act 1996. The decision upheld the conclusion that he was not in priority need and informed him of the 21-day period for appealing to the County Court on an error of law.

His appeal was issued about one month late. A County Court judge extended time because the respondent had relied on Crisis to obtain legal representation and had awaited a solicitor. The borough appealed, arguing that the wrong test had been applied, irrelevant considerations had been taken into account, and the extension was irrational. The respondent relied additionally on the need to secure legal aid and costs protection. The central issue was whether there was a good reason for the delay under section 204(2A)(b).

1. The appeal was allowed. The application to extend time for bringing the homelessness appeal was refused.
2. Under section 204(2A)(b) of the Housing Act 1996, the court must be satisfied that there was a good reason both for the failure to bring the appeal within 21 days and for any later delay in applying for permission. The merits of the proposed appeal are irrelevant: Short v Birmingham City Council [2005] EWHC 2112.
3. Good reason is an ordinary expression requiring no elaboration. There are no bright lines and no general rule either fixing a litigant with every procedural error of a representative or allowing a litigant to shelter behind legal-adviser mistakes. The court must examine all the facts and evidence. This approach was drawn from Barrett v The Mayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of Southwark [2008] EWHC 1568 and Poorsalehy v London Borough of Wandsworth [2013] EWHC 3687.
4. Bringing an appeal requires an Appellant’s Notice, the appropriate fee or fee-remission application, and grounds of appeal. Legal representation is not a prerequisite. The lower judge therefore erred by treating the respondent’s lack of representation, reliance on Crisis, and the perceived technical nature of the grounds as establishing good reason.
5. The fact of being a litigant in person has only limited, if any, significance. The approach in R (Hysaj) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 1633, as endorsed in Nata Lee Limited v Abid [2014] EWCA Civ 1652, was applied. Pending legal-aid arrangements may be relevant but cannot be decisive. Costs protection did not materially alter the conclusion. The reasoning in R (Kigen) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWCA Civ 1286 and ZP (South Africa) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWCA Civ 1273 supported that conclusion.

• County Court: extended time for the respondent to bring his appeal under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996.
• High Court (Queen’s Bench Division): allowed the borough’s appeal and refused the respondent’s application to extend time.