GR Property Management Ltd v Safdar & Ors

Under the Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993, an application to determine disputed acquisition terms must be made to the statutory appropriate tribunal within the prescribed period. An application to the County Court, even if joined to proceedings within its jurisdiction or later transferred to the First-tier Tribunal, does not satisfy that requirement. Where legislation specifies both the condition and the consequence of non-compliance, the court must give effect to its plain meaning. Practical convenience cannot justify altering the statutory allocation of jurisdiction. The consequence here was deemed withdrawal of the initial notice.

Qualifying lessees served an initial notice seeking collective enfranchisement. The freeholder admitted the right to enfranchise but disputed the proposed terms of acquisition.

Before expiry of the six-month period, the lessees issued a Part 8 application in the County Court seeking leave to amend the initial notice and determination of the disputed terms. No application was made to the First-tier Tribunal within time. The County Court later transferred the terms application to the First-tier Tribunal, and HHJ Gerald dismissed the freeholder’s appeal from that decision.

The central issue was whether the County Court application, joined with the amendment application, was an application to the appropriate tribunal for the purposes of the statutory time limit.

The appeal was allowed unanimously. The lessees’ initial notice was deemed withdrawn because the application to determine the disputed terms was not made to the appropriate tribunal within six months of the counter-notice.

1. Under sections 24(1) and (2) of the Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993, an application for determination of disputed terms must be made, if at all, to the appropriate tribunal. In England that meant the First-tier Tribunal, subject to the statutory provision for the Upper Tribunal. The County Court was not the appropriate tribunal.
2. The statutory definition applied despite the practical advantages identified below, including procedural simplicity, case management and reduced costs. The parallel provisions governing individual lease extensions reinforced the need for a consistent interpretation.
3. Section 90(4) could confer on the County Court jurisdiction to hear and determine joined proceedings which would otherwise fall outside its general jurisdiction when the court was already seized of proceedings within section 90(1) or (2). Even assuming that power applied, it did not alter the requirement that the section 24 application be made to the appropriate tribunal. A County Court application was not transformed into a tribunal application by later transfer.
4. The principles in R v Soneji [2006] 1 AC 340 and Natt v Osman [2014] EWCA Civ 1520 concerned statutes silent as to the consequences of non-compliance. Here the 1993 Act clearly stated both the condition and the consequence. The approach in Shahid v Scottish Ministers [2015] UKSC 58 and the plain-meaning principle in Duport Steel Ltd v Sirs [1980] 1 WLR 142 supported giving effect to that language.

Arnold LJ added that the legislative division between the specialist tribunal and the County Court was rational, although its possible effect on efficient dispute resolution might warrant legislative consideration.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — Appeal from the County Court was allowed. [2020] EWCA Civ 1441.
• County Court at Central London — DDJ Ackland transferred the terms application to the First-tier Tribunal. HHJ Gerald dismissed the freeholder’s appeal from that order.