Sadler v Joyner & Anor

Meaning is assessed by reading the publication once as a whole, from the perspective of the hypothetical reasonable reader, in its context and mode of publication. A publication may contain factual allegations even where it uses questions, qualifying words or expressions of apparent opinion. The court must distinguish the meaning conveyed by the publication from inferences individual readers may draw. Where allegations of serious professional misconduct, fabrication of evidence, improper prosecution and waste of public money are conveyed, they are capable of being defamatory at common law. A statement may be opinion only where it is recognisable as comment and indicates, in general or specific terms, the facts forming its basis.

The claimant, a solicitor employed by the Environment Agency, brought libel and harassment proceedings against the defendants. The libel claim concerned a press release published online by the second defendant after the first defendant had been prosecuted for environmental offences.

The parties agreed that preliminary issues should determine the natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of, whether those meanings were defamatory, whether the words were fact or opinion, and, if opinion, whether the basis of the opinion was indicated.

1. Meaning. The court read the press release once, as a whole, from the standpoint of the hypothetical reasonable fair-minded reader, having regard to its context and mode of publication. The publication conveyed serious allegations about the claimant’s conduct as a prosecutor. The first three meanings were factual allegations that he knowingly induced a convicted criminal to invent false evidence, pursued a prosecution which had no chance of succeeding and wasted £6,000 of government money, and that there were strong grounds to suspect that he acted vindictively and would go to any length to obtain a conviction. The fourth meaning was that his suitability for his position at the Environment Agency was questionable.
2. The use of questions, words such as “appears”, and expressions of apparent opinion did not convert the factual allegations into opinion. The surrounding text reinforced rather than ameliorated the meanings. The third meaning was pitched at a strong suspicion level rather than as a Chase level 1 allegation, although it remained a statement of fact.
3. Defamatory meaning. The meanings were defamatory at common law. Allegations of the seriousness found in this case fell on the actionable side of the threshold.
4. Fact and opinion. The first three meanings were statements of fact. The fourth was a statement of opinion. It indicated, in general terms, the factual basis for that opinion. The relevant preliminary issues were therefore determined accordingly.
5. Costs. The defendants were ordered to pay the claimant’s costs of the preliminary-issues trial, subject to detailed assessment on the standard basis, with an interim payment of £20,000 within 14 days.