Hathi & Ors v News Corp UK and Ireland Ltd & Anor

In determining the meaning of allegedly defamatory words, the court must consider the publication as a whole and identify a single natural and ordinary meaning for the hypothetical reasonable reader. The reader is neither naïve nor avid for scandal. Context, presentation and the distinction between different levels of defamatory meaning must be considered, but strained interpretations must be rejected. The court may select the appropriate meaning independently of the parties’ formulations, subject to the pleaded limit. Evidence outside the publication is inadmissible on meaning. A distinction remains material between meaning that there are reasonable grounds to suspect wrongdoing and the less serious meaning that there are grounds to investigate whether wrongdoing occurred.

The claimants brought libel proceedings concerning an article published by the second defendant in Mail Online. Warby J directed a preliminary trial of the meaning of the words complained of. The claimants contended that the article conveyed reasonable grounds to suspect that they had illegally let their property and profited from the resulting conditions. The second defendant contended that it conveyed only that there were grounds to investigate whether the claimants knowingly permitted unlawful subletting and should be prosecuted. The issue of serious harm and whether the words were defamatory was outside the scope of this trial.

1. The court adopted the established approach to meaning. The article had to be read as a whole, applying the single meaning rule. The hypothetical reasonable reader is not naïve or unduly suspicious, and will not select a more serious meaning where a less serious meaning is reasonably available. The court must avoid over-elaborate or strained analysis. External evidence is inadmissible on meaning: see Koutsogiannis v Random House Group [2019] EWHC 48.
2. The headline and images were relevant and prominent, but they did not substantially displace the article’s text. The article set out the account that the property manager and claimants lacked knowledge of the overcrowding, and reported that the council’s investigation remained incomplete.
3. The distinction between Chase level 2, involving reasonable grounds to suspect wrongdoing, and Chase level 3, involving grounds to investigate whether wrongdoing occurred, was material. The court applied that distinction in assessing the competing meanings.
4. Read as a whole, the article conveyed that the claimants owned a house which had been illegally rented to 35 tenants living in cramped and squalid conditions, and that there were grounds to investigate whether they knowingly permitted the subletting and should therefore be prosecuted for housing-law offences. It did not convey objectively reasonable grounds to suspect that they were responsible for the wrongdoing.
5. The court therefore determined the meaning set out above. The trial did not determine whether the words were defamatory or satisfied the serious-harm requirement.

Warby J directed a preliminary trial of meaning. The present judgment determined that preliminary issue only.