Idolo, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Bromley

Where an adult’s assessed care and support needs include rehousing, the Care Act 2014 does not permit the local authority to bypass the priority scheme governing its housing duties. The authority must identify housing needs through its care assessment processes, take the person’s wishes and well-being into account, and work cooperatively across departments. The housing need must then be addressed under the Housing Act 1996 allocation scheme. Article 8 may be engaged by culpable delay in providing a public-law benefit, but serious delay alone does not establish a breach or give rise to damages. The claimant must show both a breach of legal duty and conduct sufficiently culpable to amount to a lack of respect for private or family life.

The claimant, a disabled council tenant, became paralysed and unable to leave his bedroom or use the bathroom in his eighth-floor flat. The council assessed his care needs, provided domiciliary care and equipment, and later identified a need for rehousing in wheelchair-accessible accommodation. He was placed on the housing register and ultimately moved to suitable accommodation.

He sought judicial review declarations and damages, alleging unlawful delay, breach of duties under the Care Act 2014 and Housing Act 1996, and breach of Article 8. The central issue was whether the council should have met the housing need through its social-care functions, or had otherwise acted unlawfully in the time taken to rehouse him.

1. Claim dismissed. The claimant established no breach of the council’s statutory duties or Article 8 capable of supporting declaratory relief or damages.
2. The general well-being duty in section 1 of the Care Act 2014, together with the assessment duties under sections 9 and 13, required the council to identify and assess the claimant’s housing-related needs. Those duties extended to considering the suitability of his accommodation, his desired outcomes and his family’s preferences.
3. Section 23 of the Care Act 2014 created a boundary between care and support functions and housing functions. Where the council was required to provide housing under the Housing Act 1996, the Care Act could not be used to meet that need by acquiring or allocating housing outside the housing priority scheme. The council nevertheless remained obliged to provide any additional care, support or adaptations falling within the Care Act.
4. The claimant’s need to move because of disability fell within section 166A(3)(d) of the Housing Act 1996. The council was required to give reasonable preference within its allocation scheme. The evidence did not show that the claimant’s banding was defective, that suitable accommodation was available sooner, or that the council had failed to consider alternative interim arrangements.
5. Article 8 can require positive measures concerning housing. Following Anufrijeva v Southwark LBC [2003] EWCA Civ 1406, delay may infringe Article 8 where substantial prejudice results, but the delay must be attributable to a breach of legal duty and involve culpability. The claimant’s severe predicament did not itself establish the necessary lack of respect or culpability.
6. R (on the application of Bernard) v Enfield LBC [2002] EWHC 2282 was materially different because breach and serious administrative failures had been conceded. The observations in R (on the application of Hughes) v Liverpool City Council [2005] EWHC 428 (Admin) did not require a different conclusion.
7. The procedural guidance in Anufrijeva concerning proportionate routes for maladministration damages claims should be addressed at the permission stage, including internal complaints, ombudsman procedures and alternative dispute resolution.