Hijazi v Yaxley-Lennon

Meaning in a libel claim is assessed by the natural and ordinary meaning conveyed to the ordinary reasonable reader or viewer, taking account of the publication’s medium and relevant context. Context may include ordinary general knowledge and material put before the audience by the publisher. Material known only to some readers is generally relevant to an innuendo meaning. A party relying on context must plead it. A later publication is not ordinarily transformed by an earlier publication merely because some people saw both. Separately pleaded publications should be assessed individually unless a proper contextual connection is established. Principles concerning proof of the substantial truth of a defamatory sting relate to the truth defence, not the anterior question of meaning.

Jamal Hijazi, by his litigation friend, brought a libel claim against Stephen Yaxley-Lennon concerning two self-recorded videos posted on Facebook on 28 and 29 November 2018. The defendant admitted publication, defamation at common law and serious harm to the claimant’s reputation, but advanced a defence of truth.

Senior Master Fontaine ordered the meanings of the two videos to be determined as preliminary issues. The court therefore considered whether the publications bore the meanings pleaded by the claimant, the amended meaning advanced by the defendant, or another meaning. The truth defence and other issues were reserved for a later trial.

The court determined the natural and ordinary meanings of the two videos only. It did not decide whether the meanings were true.

1. Approach to meaning. Meaning was to be assessed from the perspective of the ordinary reasonable reader or viewer, without over-analysis and with proper regard to the medium and context of publication. The court applied the approach in Koutsogiannis v The Random House Group Limited [2020] 4 WLR 25 and the emphasis on medium and context in Stocker v Stocker [2019] 2 WLR 1033; Skuse v Granada Television Limited [1996] EMLR 278 was relevant guidance for a publication viewed rather than read. The judge followed the viewing approach described in Triplark Limited v Northwood Hall (Freehold) Limited & Others [2019] EWHC 3494 (QB).
2. Context. Following Monroe v Hopkins [2017] EMLR 16, context could include ordinary general knowledge and matters put before the reader or viewer by the publisher. Extrinsic material had to be sufficiently closely connected and likely to have been in the hypothetical viewer’s mind. Context had to be pleaded. Material known only to some readers was relevant to innuendo, not natural and ordinary meaning. The judge also noted the fact-sensitive considerations concerning hyperlinks identified in Poulter v Times Newspapers Ltd [2018] EWHC 3900 (QB).
3. Truth defence. The authorities relied on by the defendant concerning proof of the substantial truth of the sting, including Turcu v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2005] EWHC 799 (QB), Chase v News Group Newspapers Limited [2003] EMLR 11 and Simpson v MGN Ltd [2016] EMLR 26, concerned the truth defence and did not govern the determination of meaning.
4. Meanings. The First Video conveyed that the claimant had participated, as part of a gang, in a violent assault on a young girl causing significant injuries, and had threatened to stab another child. The Second Video conveyed the allegation concerning the gang assault and injuries, but did not convey the threat to stab or participation in the other incidents mentioned. The court rejected broader meanings suggesting general violence or multiple incidents and rejected the defendant’s narrower meaning because it failed to capture the gravity of the First Video’s allegations.

The claim was issued on 15 May 2019. On 15 November 2019, Senior Master Fontaine ordered determination of the meanings of the two videos as preliminary issues. This first-instance judgment determined those issues; the truth defence and other matters were reserved.