Lisa Jane Ford v Jonathan Tippet Seymour-Williams

Under section 2(2) of the Animals Act 1971, liability for damage caused by an animal outside a dangerous species requires all statutory conditions to be satisfied. Where the relevant characteristic occurs only at particular times or in particular circumstances, the claimant must identify the particular circumstance that gave rise to it on the occasion in question. The keeper’s knowledge must extend to that characteristic and circumstance, not merely to the species’ general capacity for the behaviour. The provision remains one of strict liability and does not require negligence. The appeal was dismissed because the keeper lacked knowledge that the horse might rear following catastrophic internal injury.

The appellant, an experienced horsewoman employed at the respondent’s yard, suffered severe injuries when a horse reared and fell on her. She brought a claim against the horse’s keeper under section 2(2) of the Animals Act 1971, relying solely on statutory strict liability.

After a three-day trial, the High Court dismissed the claim. The judge found that the horse had reared because of a probable cardiovascular event and that the respondent lacked the necessary knowledge under section 2(2)(c): [2021] EWHC 312 (QB). The appeal concerned whether the particular time or circumstance giving rise to the characteristic had to be identified, and whether the keeper’s knowledge had to extend to it.

1. Disposition. Lady Justice Carr, with Lady Justice Macur and Lord Justice William Davis agreeing, dismissed the appeal and upheld the dismissal of the claim.
2. Statutory construction. Section 2(2) of the Animals Act 1971 imposes strict liability only where all three statutory limbs are satisfied. The damage requirement in paragraph (a) was common ground. The appeal concerned the second limb of paragraph (b) and the knowledge requirement in paragraph (c). The statutory scheme distinguishes liability for animals of dangerous species under section 2(1) from liability for dangerous characteristics of animals of other species. It does not impose negligence-based liability.
3. Particular circumstance. The authorities, including Mirvahedy v Henley [2003] UKHL 16, Welsh v Stokes [2007] EWCA Civ 1185, Freeman v Higher Park Farm [2008] EWCA Civ 1185, Goldsmith v Patchcott [2012] EWCA Civ 183 and Turnbull v Warrener [2012] EWCA Civ 412, establish that the claimant must identify both the relevant characteristic and the particular time or circumstance in which it arose. Those circumstances must be capable of description and prediction. The approach is not confined to horses, as shown by Williams v Hawkes [2018] EWCA Civ 1846.
4. Knowledge and application. The respondent’s knowledge under section 2(2)(c) had to extend to the particular circumstance giving rise to the rearing. The judge was entitled to find that the rearing was probably caused by catastrophic internal injury, so the condition in section 2(2)(b) was met, but that the possibility was only theoretical and was not known to the respondent or the appellant. The evidence as a whole supported that finding, and there was no proper basis for appellate interference.
5. The judge had not found that the horse reared because of disobedience, panic or pain independently of the cardiovascular event. The alternative arguments therefore failed. The decision did not require proof of negligence and struck the statutory balance between a claimant’s remedy and protection for keepers lacking knowledge of the relevant circumstance.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — Appeal dismissed and the High Court’s decision upheld: [2021] EWCA Civ 1848.
• High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division — Claim dismissed after the judge found that the respondent lacked the knowledge required by section 2(2)(c) of the Animals Act 1971: [2021] EWHC 312 (QB).