Haviland v The Andrew Lownie Literary Agency Ltd & Anor

Natural and ordinary meaning in a defamation claim is determined by reading the words as a reasonable reader would, without elaborate analysis or reliance on the parties’ submissions. Context may show that an allegation of inaccuracy conveys deliberate deception rather than innocent error. A statement is defamatory at common law only where it imputes conduct tending to lower the claimant in the estimation of right-thinking people and crosses the threshold of seriousness. Complaints which an ordinary reader would regard as semantic or trivial do not satisfy that threshold. The common-law determination is distinct from the later question whether serious harm is established under Defamation Act 2013.

The claimant brought a libel claim concerning seven emails sent by the defendants to Reedsy, an online author-services firm, about statements in the claimant’s profile. The parties disputed the natural and ordinary meanings of the Second to Seventh Emails. The defendants accepted the pleaded meaning of the First Email but contended that, save for one allegation concerning complaints about the claimant’s work, the emails merely challenged inaccuracies and were not defamatory.

The court determined preliminary issues concerning meaning and whether the meanings were defamatory at common law. No hearing took place; the issues were decided on written submissions.

1. The court determined the natural and ordinary meanings of the Emails by considering the words in their proper context and asking how they would be understood by the ordinary reasonable reader. The reader’s initial impression was important, and the exercise did not require elaborate analysis. The principles in Koutsogiannis v Random House Group Ltd [2020] 4 WLR 25, Tinkler v Ferguson [2020] EWCA Civ 819 and Sheikh v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2019] EWHC 2947 (QB) were applied.
2. The First to Fourth Emails conveyed, in substance, that the claimant had knowingly published false and misleading information, including false claims about books, endorsements and Thistle Publishing. The Seventh Email conveyed knowingly false and misleading statements concerning the claimant’s contribution to a bestselling book, his sales ranking and the endorsement. Those meanings connoted deception or an attempt to deceive and were defamatory at common law.
3. The Fifth and Sixth Emails concerned the claimant’s descriptions of running Thistle Publishing and being its publisher. In context, an ordinary reasonable reader would regard the dispute as semantic and trivial. Those meanings did not cross the common-law threshold of seriousness and were not defamatory.
4. The repetition rule was relevant to the Third Email, whose meaning was assessed in the context of the earlier complaints and the continuing dispute. The court adopted the approach discussed in Koutsogiannis v Random House Group Ltd [2020] 4 WLR 25.
5. The ruling on defamatory meaning concerned only the common-law test. Whether the claimant could satisfy Defamation Act 2013, s.1, in respect of the First to Fourth and Seventh Emails remained to be determined later.