Guerrilla Marketing Ltd v NGM Advertising Limited

In determining defamatory meaning, the court must identify the single natural and ordinary meaning conveyed to the hypothetical reasonable reader, reading the publication as a whole and in context. Chase levels are useful shorthand, not a rigid classification. Conditional language does not prevent a defamatory imputation where the uncertainty concerns its consequences rather than the alleged misconduct itself. Whether an allegation of dishonesty or fraud is fact or opinion depends on the wording and context. An allegation expressed as a factual conclusion drawn from asserted facts will be treated as fact. A publication is defamatory at common law where it attributes conduct contrary to common social views and would tend to have a substantially adverse effect on treatment of the claimant.

The claimant and first defendant competed in marketing advertising space on digital screens at educational establishments. The claimant alleged that emails sent by the individual defendants to two employees of a former customer accused it of marketing screens which it did not own or operate. The claimant brought claims including libel, malicious falsehood, unlawful interference with economic interests and procuring breach of contract.

On an order of Collins Rice J dated 3 November 2025, the court determined preliminary issues concerning the natural and ordinary meanings of six emails, whether those meanings were fact or opinion, and whether they were defamatory at common law.

1. Meaning. The court applied the principles stated in Koutsogiannis v Random House Group Ltd [2019] EWHC 48 (QB), as approved in Millett v Corbyn [2021] EWCA Civ 567. Meaning was assessed holistically, having regard to the limited and commercially informed readership, the email chain, the mode of publication and the development of the allegations over time.
2. The first email conveyed reasonable grounds to investigate possible unauthorised marketing of the first defendant’s screens. It was a Chase level 3 meaning, factual but not defamatory. The second email conveyed reasonable grounds to suspect that the claimant had dishonestly made knowingly false claims and deceived customers. It was a Chase level 2 meaning, factual and defamatory.
3. The third, fourth and fifth emails conveyed unqualified allegations of fraudulent mis-selling, subject only to uncertainty whether the customer had purchased the relevant advertising space. The sixth email likewise conveyed that any relevant claims were dishonestly made and that fraudulent mis-selling extended beyond the first defendant’s screens. These were Chase level 1 meanings. All were statements of fact and defamatory.
4. Chase levels, derived from Chase v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1772, are a helpful shorthand rather than a straitjacket. Repetition of information supplied by others does not reduce the seriousness of an allegation where the publisher adopts it without qualification. Earlier emails informed the meaning of later emails, but later wording could not retrospectively alter the meaning of earlier publications, applying Grappelli v Derek Block Holdings Ltd [1981] 1 WLR 822.
5. There is no fixed rule that allegations of dishonesty or fraud are fact or opinion. In context, the fraud allegations were factual shorthand conclusions drawn from facts presented as true. Conditionality concerning whether the customer had contracted did not remove the defamatory imputation.