Summerfield Browne Ltd v Waymouth (Rev1)

In a defamation claim, an allegation that a solicitor is dishonest or fraudulent ordinarily alleges fact rather than opinion. It cannot be converted into honest opinion merely by presenting it as a belief. The statutory public-interest defence requires consideration of the subject matter, the defendant’s belief, and whether that belief was reasonable. A demand for payment in return for removing a publication, together with the absence of reasonable checks, may undermine that defence. Summary judgment is appropriate where allegations are unsupported and fanciful, provided the court avoids conducting a mini-trial. Damages must reflect seriousness, proven financial impact and vindication. Injunctive relief and an order requiring a website operator to remove the publication may be justified where further publication or voluntary removal is unlikely.

The claimant, a firm of solicitors, sued its former client for libel arising from a Trustpilot review describing it as a waste of money and a scam solicitor. The defendant pleaded honest opinion, public interest, truth and lack of serious harm. The defendant did not attend the strike-out and summary-judgment hearing and failed to comply with an order requiring an amended defence. The remaining defence was struck out and judgment entered for the claimant. At the remedies hearing the court determined damages, injunctive relief, removal of the review by the website operator, costs and publication of the judgment.

1. The court struck out the defence of honest opinion. Applying Wasserman v Freilich [2016] EWHC 312 (QB), an allegation of dishonesty or fraud is ordinarily an allegation of fact. The words “scam solicitor” conveyed dishonesty and could not be recast as opinion by the defendant simply asserting that they represented his opinion.
2. The defence of public interest had no real prospect of success. The relevant questions, identified in Economou v de Freitas [2018] EWCA Civ 2591, were whether the publication concerned a matter of public interest, whether the defendant believed publication was in the public interest, and whether that belief was reasonable. The defendant had made no adequate enquiries, repeated the allegations, demanded money for removing the review and failed to use the claimant’s complaints procedure. That conduct wholly undermined the defence.
3. The defence of truth was fanciful and had no real prospect of success. The court recognised that summary judgment must not become a mini-trial, but the complete absence of credible supporting material justified judgment on the defence.
4. The claimant established a substantial defamatory impact. Enquiries fell markedly after publication and the review deterred potential clients. Special damages were not proved because there was no detailed financial or accounting evidence. General damages of £25,000 adequately reflected seriousness, financial loss and vindication, having regard to the principles discussed in Barron v Vines [2016] EWHC 1226 QB, Dhir v Saddler [2018] 4 WLR 1 and comparable awards.
5. A permanent injunction requiring removal and restraining republication was reasonable and proportionate. The defendant’s lack of engagement made voluntary compliance unlikely. The court also ordered Trustpilot to remove the review under section 13 of the Defamation Act 2013, while permitting Trustpilot to apply to vary or discharge the order.
6. The claimant received £25,000 general damages and £3,450 further costs. The judgment was directed to be published on BAILII.