MR ANEEL MUSSARAT v WORLDVIEW MEDIA NETWORK LIMITED

Where a defendant has been properly notified of a defamation application and deliberately takes no part, the court may proceed in its absence where doing so is compatible with the overriding objective and the requirements of freedom of expression. On an application for default judgment, the court ordinarily proceeds on the claimant’s unchallenged statement of case, provided the procedural conditions are met. A broadcaster is a publisher where a delay between production and broadcast gives it effective control over the content. After default judgment, summary relief may include damages, a restraining order and a declaration of falsity. The court must assess the remedies cumulatively. A declaration is appropriate where damages alone would not adequately vindicate the claimant and the statutory conditions for summary relief are satisfied.

The claimant brought a libel claim concerning serious allegations broadcast on the defendant’s television channel. The defendant did not acknowledge service, file a defence, respond to correspondence or attend the hearing.

The claimant applied for judgment in default and summary relief under the Defamation Act 1996. The court considered whether it could proceed in the defendant’s absence, whether the defendant was a publisher for the purposes of the Defamation Act 2013, whether default judgment should be entered, and what remedies should follow.

1. Proceeding in the defendant’s absence. The court adopted the two-stage approach in Pirtek (UK) Limited v Robert Jackson [2017] EWHC 2834 (QB): first, whether the defendant had proper notice of the hearing and matters to be considered; secondly, whether the evidence disclosed a reason to adjourn. The defendant had received repeated notice and there was no reason to adjourn. The hearing therefore proceeded in its absence.
2. Default judgment. The conditions in CPR 12 and Practice Direction 12 were satisfied. The particulars of claim had been served, the defendant had not acknowledged service or filed a defence, and the claim had not been satisfied or admitted. The court ordinarily proceeds on the unchallenged particulars of claim under CPR 23.11(1), without an evidential trial of the merits, unless there is a reason to depart from that approach.
3. Jurisdiction and serious harm. Although the programme was broadcast as live, the two-hour delay between the Indian production and UK transmission, together with evidence of pre-broadcast checks, showed that the defendant had effective control over the content. It was therefore a publisher within section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013, and the court had jurisdiction under section 10. The words complained of bore a serious defamatory meaning and had caused or were likely to cause serious harm to the claimant’s reputation.
4. Summary relief and remedies. Following default judgment, the court could grant summary relief under sections 8 and 9 of the Defamation Act 1996. The defendant had no defence with a realistic prospect of success and damages did not require a trial. The court awarded the statutory maximum of £10,000 and granted an injunction restraining repetition, given the seriousness of the allegations and the continuing broadcasting licence.
5. The remedies under section 9 had to be assessed cumulatively. Applying the approach in Mawdsley v Guardian Newspapers Ltd [2002] EWHC 1780 (QB), damages alone would not adequately vindicate the claimant. A declaration that the allegations were false and defamatory was therefore granted. The claimant’s costs were summarily assessed at £37,500.

First-instance decision. No prior or appellate decision is stated in the judgment.