R v Jamie Wilder

Where the conditions for a life sentence under section 285 of the Sentencing Act 2020 are met, and the seriousness of the offence or associated offences justifies life imprisonment, the court must impose that sentence. It is not a discretionary life sentence.

The seriousness assessment requires regard to the gravity of the offending, previous convictions, the danger posed to the public including whether its duration can reliably be estimated, and available alternative sentences. Foreseeable harm is relevant even where the offence charged did not require an intention to endanger life. A properly supported finding of significant risk, coupled with an unreliable prediction of when the offender will cease to be dangerous, may justify a life sentence.

The appellant pleaded guilty at Lewes Crown Court to conspiracies to commit criminal damage and arson, and to drug-supply offences. He orchestrated attacks on social workers following their involvement with children connected to him. The arson attack was carried out at the wrong address and caused damage to an elderly couple’s car and home.

On 23 December 2022, HHJ Gold KC imposed life imprisonment for conspiracy to commit arson under section 285 of the Sentencing Act 2020, with a minimum term of three years and 208 days. A seven-year determinate sentence for a Class A drug-supply offence was consecutive.

The appellant appealed only the life sentence. He challenged the findings of dangerousness and of sufficient seriousness to justify life imprisonment.

1. Appeal dismissed. The sentencing judge was entitled to find that the appellant posed a significant risk of serious harm. There was ample material supporting that conclusion, including the circumstances of the index offences, the appellant’s record, and the detailed pre-sentence report. The Court considered the conclusion inevitable on the facts.

2. Section 285(3) of the Sentencing Act 2020 required, rather than merely permitted, life imprisonment once the statutory dangerousness conditions were met and the seriousness of the offence or associated offences justified it. The sentence is therefore not a discretionary life sentence.

3. The principles in R v Burinskas (Attorney-General’s Reference No 27 of 2013) [2014] EWCA Crim 334 continued to apply following their codification in the Sentencing Code. The judge properly considered the extreme seriousness of the offences, the appellant’s previous convictions, the high risk he posed, the inability reliably to estimate when he would cease to be dangerous, and the available determinate or extended alternatives. The foreseeable harm from arson included the damage caused to the house as well as to the vehicle.

4. The judge was therefore entitled to conclude that life imprisonment was justified and required. The Court also accepted the parties’ agreement that the minimum term was not unlawful. Its clear effect was that the appellant would serve at least eight years, less time on remand, before becoming eligible for Parole Board consideration. There was no basis on the appeal to increase the minimum term.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — Dismissed the appeal against sentence and upheld the life sentence imposed under section 285 of the Sentencing Act 2020: [2023] EWCA Crim 1295.

• Crown Court at Lewes — On 23 December 2022, imposed life imprisonment for conspiracy to commit arson, with a minimum term of three years and 208 days, and a consecutive seven-year determinate sentence for a Class A drug-supply offence.