R v Seamus MacFhearchair

A discretionary life sentence for a dangerous offender is a sentence of last resort. The court must assess the seriousness of the offences, previous convictions, the offender’s risk to the public, whether a reliable estimate can be made of how long that risk will continue, and available alternatives. Uncertainty about the duration of danger cannot alone justify life imprisonment. However, once the seriousness of the offending justifies a life sentence under section 285(3) of the Sentencing Act 2020, the sentencer has no further discretion and must impose it. Remand credit must be calculated by days, not months.

On 18 October 2024, the Crown Court at Snaresbrook sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment for attempting to sexually assault by penetration, together with sentences for stalking, sexual assault and common assault. The life sentence was imposed under section 285 of the Sentencing Act 2020 following a finding that the appellant posed a serious risk of causing serious harm by further specified offences.

With leave, the appellant argued that the life sentence was manifestly excessive or wrong in principle. The issues included the seriousness and planning of the offending, the significance of previous convictions, the assessment of future risk, the possibility of treatment, and the availability of alternative sentences.

The court dismissed the appeal against the imposition of the life sentence. It corrected the minimum term because the remand deduction had been calculated in months rather than days.

1. Applicable framework. Following Attorney General’s Reference No 27 of 2013 (R v Burinskas) [2014] EWCA Crim 334, the court considered the seriousness of the lead offence and associated offences, the appellant’s previous convictions, the level and duration of the danger posed, and the available alternative sentences. Life imprisonment remained a sentence of last resort.
2. Seriousness and aggravating factors. The evidence supported the sentencing judge’s inference that the appellant had been seeking young female victims. That amounted to significant planning. The lead offence was correctly placed in category A2, and the time and location of the offending were properly treated as aggravating factors. Any suggested error in categorising the stalking offence would not have affected the life-sentence decision or minimum term.
3. Risk. The assessment of future danger was intensely fact-dependent. The appellant’s persistent and escalating sexual offending, repeated breaches of protective orders and suspended sentences, and the expert evidence justified the conclusion that it was impossible to say when, if ever, he would cease to pose a serious risk. The treatment evidence did not undermine that conclusion.
4. Duration of danger and consequence. Uncertainty about how long an offender would remain dangerous could not, by itself, justify a life sentence. The sentencing judge had, however, considered all the required matters, including alternative sentences. Once the statutory seriousness threshold was met, there was no further discretion to impose a different sentence: R v Wilder [2023] EWCA Crim 1295.
5. Minimum term. Time spent on remand had to be calculated and deducted by reference to days, not months, applying R v Cookson [2023] EWCA Crim 10. The agreed deduction of 438 days reduced the minimum term to 4 years and 18 days.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) The appeal against the life sentence was dismissed. The minimum term was corrected and reduced to 4 years and 18 days: [2025] EWCA Crim 1524.
2. Crown Court at Snaresbrook On 18 October 2024, the appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment under the Sentencing Act 2020, with a minimum term of 4 years and 1 month as originally calculated.