R v Kyle Anthony Stevens

A Sexual Harm Prevention Order should be imposed only where, and to the extent that, its terms are necessary to protect against an identified risk of harm and proportionate to the nature and scale of that risk. The parties and judge must consider the appropriate duration carefully, and the judge must give reasons for the period selected. The duration should ordinarily align with the notification period. Under section 352 of the Sentencing Act 2020, a longer order automatically extends the notification requirements until the order is discharged. A period exceeding the minimum must be justified by the evidence and circumstances of the case.

The appellant pleaded guilty in the Crown Court at Bournemouth to offences involving indecent images of children and extreme pornographic images. He received concurrent three-year community orders and a Sexual Harm Prevention Order in the same terms for ten years. The sentencing judge gave no reasons for selecting that duration and mistakenly stated that the notification requirements would last for five years.

The appellant challenged only the duration of the order, arguing that five years was sufficient and that ten years was disproportionate. The central issue was whether the ten-year period was manifestly excessive or wrong in principle.

Appeal allowed. The ten-year duration of the Sexual Harm Prevention Order was quashed and an order in the same terms was substituted for five years.

1. The court identified the relevant principles from R v Smith (Steven) [2011] EWCA Crim 1772, R v Hammond (Paul Churchill) [2008] EWCA Crim 1358 and R v Beedle (Robert) [2019] EWCA Crim 1672. An SHPO, including its terms and arrangements, must be necessary to protect against an identified risk of harm and proportionate to the nature and scale of that risk. The parties and judge should consider these issues carefully. The judge should give reasons for the selected period. The SHPO period should ordinarily correspond with the notification period.

2. By virtue of section 352 of the Sentencing Act 2020, notification requirements under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 continue until the SHPO is discharged. A longer SHPO therefore automatically extends the notification period. The sentencing judge had failed to appreciate that consequence.

3. The sentencing remarks contained no explanation for the ten-year period, and there appeared to have been no consideration of duration. That was an error. On the evidence, an SHPO was necessary, but the appellant’s developing insight, commitment to rehabilitation and reducing risk meant that five years was sufficient. Nothing in the offending, antecedents or pre-sentence report demonstrated a real need to go beyond that period. Ten years was consequently disproportionate and unnecessary to that extent.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2023] EWCA Crim 397, the appeal against the duration of the Sexual Harm Prevention Order was allowed. The ten-year period was quashed and five years substituted.
• Crown Court at Bournemouth: On 4 November 2022, the appellant was sentenced following guilty pleas and made subject to a ten-year Sexual Harm Prevention Order.