R v Babloo Miah

A sexual harm prevention order (SHPO) is a discretionary protective order. It may be imposed, and its terms and duration fixed, only where necessary and proportionate to an identified risk of sexual harm. The duration is not automatically governed by the offender's statutory notification period. Notification requirements and an SHPO operate in tandem, but they serve different functions; the notification period is a factor in the assessment, not a default duration. The court must make an individualised assessment of risk, the offending and offender, and available monitoring or later safeguards. An order should last no longer than necessary, subject to the statutory minimum and the possibility of a later extension.

After pleading guilty before Thames Magistrates' Court to three attempted sexual offences, the appellant was sentenced at the Crown Court at Snaresbrook on 17 February 2025 to concurrent suspended terms of 12 and 20 months. The sentencing judge also imposed a sexual harm prevention order for 10 years. The period matched the appellant's 10-year notification requirement under Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.

The appeal, brought with leave, challenged only the SHPO's duration. The appellant argued that the judge had treated the notification period as determinative and had not made the required assessment of the duration necessary and proportionate to the risk of sexual harm. The central issue was whether the 10-year order could stand.

The appeal was allowed. The 10-year sexual harm prevention order was replaced by an order lasting five years. The other terms of the order and the sentences remained unchanged.

1. Statutory test. Under sections 345 and 346 of the Sentencing Act 2020, an SHPO is discretionary and may be made only where necessary for the statutory protective purpose. The necessity threshold for an order restricting individual freedom is higher than desirability, as explained in R v Collard [2004] EWCA Crim 1664. The requirement of necessity and proportionality applies to both the terms and duration of an SHPO, as established in R v Smith [2012] 1 Cr App R (S) 82.
2. Notification requirements. An SHPO and statutory notification requirements operate in tandem, but they are different measures. An SHPO must not conflict with notification requirements and cannot be used merely to extend them. Its duration may exceed the notification period where justified, or be shorter even where notification is indefinite. The notification period is therefore a factor, not an automatic measure. The court applied the guidance in R v Hanna [2023] EWCA Crim 33, treated the apparent reading in R v Hemsley [2010] EWCA Crim 225 as unnecessary to that decision, and explained the apparently broader wording in R v Stevens [2023] EWCA Crim 397 in that limited context.
3. Application. If the sentencing judge fixed the duration solely by matching the notification period, that was an error. Even if the notification period was considered as one factor, 10 years was unnecessarily long and disproportionate. The court considered the appellant's good character, the absence of further offending, compliance with bail, the circumstances of the offending, his confession and cooperation, early guilty plea, remorse, pre-sentence assessment and suspended sentence obligations. Existing notification and specialist police monitoring also reduced the need for a longer SHPO. The reasoning in R v Hammond [2008] EWCA Crim 1358 and R v Beedle [2019] EWCA Crim 1672 supported that conclusion.
4. Final order. Five years was sufficient and proportionate. If a risk remained at the end of that period, the police could seek an extension under section 350 of the Sentencing Act 2020.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On 29 January 2026, allowed the sentence appeal and substituted a five-year sexual harm prevention order under [2026] EWCA Crim 129.
2. Crown Court at Snaresbrook: On 17 February 2025, imposed concurrent suspended sentences and a 10-year sexual harm prevention order.