Sadar Jabar Osso v Local Court of Regensburg, Germany

For an appeal based on fresh evidence under the Extradition Act 2003, the evidence must have resulted in a different decision requiring discharge. A mental condition makes extradition oppressive only where the evidence establishes a sufficiently substantial suicide risk, the condition removes the requested person’s capacity to resist the impulse, and the requesting state’s arrangements cannot adequately manage the risk. A European Union receiving state will ordinarily be presumed to discharge its responsibilities absent strong evidence to the contrary.

In an accusation case, proportionality is assessed by the specified statutory factors. Serious offending and a clear public interest in prosecution may outweigh an uncertain prospect of early release. Article 8 is intensely fact-specific and ordinarily requires consequences of exceptional severity before it outweighs the public interest in extradition.

The Appellant appealed under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against District Judge Bristow’s decision of 23 March 2022 ordering extradition to Germany for alleged dangerous bodily harm and cannabis trafficking offences.

Permission had been granted only on the oppression ground. The Appellant relied on later medical evidence concerning PTSD, self-harm and suicide risk. During the appeal, he sought to admit further evidence and add grounds based on statutory disproportionality and Article 8. A later letter from the German trial judge indicated that, if the Appellant admitted the offences, a sentence of no more than three years might be imposed, with the balance suspended on probation.

The central questions were whether the fresh evidence required discharge, whether the new grounds should be permitted, and whether extradition would be oppressive, disproportionate or incompatible with Article 8.

1. Fresh evidence and oppression. The updated medical records, the Schug letter and the Appellant’s latest statement were admitted. The evidence established a mental health condition and a risk of suicide if returned to Germany, but it did not establish that the condition removed his capacity to resist the impulse to commit suicide. The records contained indications that several incidents were voluntary acts intended to communicate distress or secure changes in prison conditions. The risk was therefore not attributable to mental condition in the statutory sense required by section 25.
2. The risk had also to be assessed in context. The most recent expert report was almost a year old; the Schug letter indicated possible release on probation; the trauma relied on was principally connected with detention; and there was no evidence of a suicide risk during a substantial period when the Appellant was not detained. The presumption that Germany would provide adequate care and protection was not displaced by the incomplete CPT report. The oppression ground therefore failed, and the statutory conditions for allowing an appeal on fresh evidence were not satisfied.
3. Disproportionality. Amendment was permitted because the Schug letter constituted a material change of circumstances and the application was made promptly. Applying the specified factors in section 21A, the alleged knife assault and trafficking of 817 grams of cannabis were very serious. The possible sentence of up to three years, even on an admission, did not remove the public interest in prosecution. Early release was uncertain because the Appellant’s proposed admission was qualified and his credibility was in issue. Extradition was not disproportionate.
4. Article 8. Permission to amend was refused. The Appellant had never lived or worked in the United Kingdom outside detention, had no partner or family here, and had no established private or family life. Even if Article 8 were engaged, the prospect of early release was case-specific and had limited weight. The serious offences, the public interest in prosecution, treaty obligations and prevention of safe havens plainly outweighed the matters relied upon.
5. The applications were determined accordingly. The appeal on both the oppression and disproportionality grounds was dismissed.

• High Court (Administrative Court): District Judge Bristow’s extradition order was challenged under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003. The High Court dismissed the appeal on the oppression and disproportionality grounds and refused permission to add the Article 8 ground.