Sana Hameed v Shanzay Shahbaz Sheikh

Meaning in a defamation claim is determined by the single natural and ordinary meaning which the hypothetical reasonable reader would attribute to the publication. The publication must be considered as a whole and in its relevant medium. Images and documents published alongside words may add to or alter their meaning. A publication may convey both factual allegations and opinions. Chase levels distinguish an allegation of guilt, reasonable grounds for suspicion, and grounds for investigation. Absolute privilege attaching to statements made in judicial or criminal proceedings does not immunise a later repetition in a different context and for a different purpose, nor prevent accompanying documents from contributing to meaning.

The claimant brought a libel claim concerning a WhatsApp message and four Instagram publications relating to anonymous social-media gossip pages and investigations by Pakistani authorities. The defendant sought a preliminary determination of meaning before filing a Defence. The court considered whether the publications identified the claimant, the effect of documents published alongside the WhatsApp message, the relevance of Chase levels, and an argument based on absolute privilege. Identification by extrinsic evidence was left for trial. The central issue was the natural and ordinary meaning of each publication.

1. Meaning. The court applied the established principles summarised in Koutsogiannis v The Random House Group Limited [2019] EWHC 48 (QB), including the requirement to determine the single natural and ordinary meaning understood by the hypothetical reasonable reader. The approach had been approved in Millett v Corbyn [2021] EWCA Civ 567. Evidence was inadmissible on meaning, and the witness statements therefore played no part in the determination (paras 16, 19–20).
2. Chase levels. The court took account of the distinction in Chase v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1772 between an allegation of guilt, reasonable grounds to suspect guilt, and grounds for investigating guilt. The WhatsApp message alone conveyed that the claimant was behind the page and that there were grounds to investigate possible criminal offending. When read with the Attendance Order and Court Order, it conveyed that she was under active investigation and that there were reasonable grounds to suspect an offence (paras 17, 26–30).
3. Effect of accompanying documents. Documents published with a defamatory message may identify the claimant to a wider audience and add meaning to the publication. The orders were not themselves complained of as defamatory; their relevance was their contribution to the meaning of the message (paras 29–32).
4. Absolute privilege. Westcott v Westcott [2008] EWCA Civ 818 did not assist the defendant. The privilege applicable to statements made in judicial or criminal proceedings did not prevent the court from considering documents published with the message. A person who repeats defamatory statements in a different context and for a different purpose does not thereby obtain the original immunity (para 32).
5. The court determined meanings for all five publications. The WhatsApp message was defamatory at common law. The further publications were also defamatory if they were proved at trial to identify or refer to the claimant. Questions of reference and supporting evidence were reserved for trial (paras 33–41). Directions were given for any application to amend the claim to include misuse of private information, filing of the Defence, and further case management (paras 42–45).