Yousif Sesay & Ors v R

When imposing a life sentence, the minimum term is part of the sentence. The court must calculate it as a specific period after taking account of qualifying remand, curfew and extradition periods. The judge must announce both the calculated minimum term and the credited days in open court. Administrative correction cannot alter a life-sentence minimum term. Errors require an appeal, subject to the statutory limits on increasing sentence. The same administrative process used for determinate sentences does not apply. In murder cases, sexual conduct makes the offence particularly serious for the purposes of Schedule 21 without requiring wholly exceptional brutality. A life sentence may be justified for an exceptionally serious offence where the offender presents a serious danger and alternative sentences would not sufficiently protect the public.

The court heard four unrelated applications and renewed applications for leave to appeal sentence. Each appellant had received a life sentence or detention at His Majesty’s Pleasure with a specified minimum term. The cases arose from sentencing decisions in the Crown Courts at Manchester, Nottingham, Leeds and Cardiff.

The appeals raised a common issue concerning the effect of remand credit on a life-sentence minimum term, including whether an imprecise or erroneous calculation could be corrected administratively. Griffiths also challenged the necessity of a life sentence, and Silcox challenged the use of the Schedule 21 starting point for a murder involving sexual conduct.

1. Disposition. Each appeal was allowed to a limited extent in relation to the calculation of remand credit. The other substantive sentencing challenges were rejected. The substituted minimum terms were 21 years 64 days for Sesay, 7 years 60 days for Griffiths, 32 years 83 days for Richards, and 23 years 219 days for Silcox.
2. Life-sentence calculation. Under sections 322 and 323 of the Sentencing Code, the minimum term is part of the sentence. For murder, the court fixes the appropriate period by reference to Schedule 21 and the aggravating and mitigating factors, then deducts the relevant remand, qualifying curfew and extradition periods. The approach was consistent with R v Cookson [2023] 2 Cr App R (S) 12, insofar as it treated the minimum term as a sentence rather than an administrative calculation.
3. The correction process applicable to determinate sentences, illustrated by Gordon [2007] EWCA Crim 165, cannot be extended to a life-sentence minimum term. After the statutory period under section 385 has expired, correction requires an appeal. Section 11(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 restricts any increase unless another aspect of the sentence produces a corresponding reduction.
4. A judge imposing a life sentence must perform the arithmetic and announce a precise minimum term in years and days. The judge must also state the number of remand or curfew days counted. A warrant or court record cannot replace the sentence announced in court, and an administrative amendment has no effect. The parties, assisted by the guidance in AA [2014] EWCA Crim 2483, must provide accurate information before sentence.
5. For Griffiths, the exceptionally serious and sadistic nature of the attack, the serious danger presented and the absence of a reliable date when that danger would cease justified the life sentence. The principles in Burinskas [2014] EWCA Crim 334 were applied. For Silcox, sexual conduct made the murder particularly serious because of its sexual element. Wholly exceptional brutality was not required. The reasoning was distinct from the approach to sadistic conduct, and the approach in McSweeney [2024] EWCA Crim 1250 supported that conclusion.
6. Errors concerning remand days were not de minimis. Each error had to be corrected, even where it concerned only one day.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — In [2024] EWCA Crim 483, the court allowed each appeal to the limited extent necessary to correct the credited remand period and substituted precise minimum terms. The remaining sentencing challenges and grounds were refused.
2. Crown Court at Manchester — Sesay was sentenced to detention at His Majesty’s Pleasure with a 22-year minimum term.
3. Crown Court at Nottingham — Griffiths was sentenced to imprisonment for life with an expressed minimum term of eight years less an imprecise remand period.
4. Crown Court at Leeds — Richards was sentenced to imprisonment for life with a 33-year minimum term and a court-record entry for remand credit.
5. Crown Court at Cardiff — Silcox was sentenced to imprisonment for life with a 25-year minimum term and a subsequently amended remand-credit figure.