R v Shane Nash

For a dangerous offender, an extended sentence is insufficient where it cannot adequately protect the public and the period of serious danger cannot reliably be estimated. Uncertainty about the availability, duration and likely effect of necessary treatment may justify a discretionary life sentence. A sentencing judge may consider the accepted facts of an earlier offence and draw reasonable inferences from them, even where the earlier offending was not completed. A sentence is not manifestly excessive where it reflects the seriousness of the offences, their aggravating features, previous convictions and lasting harm.

The appellant pleaded guilty in the Crown Court at Nottingham to attempted rape and rape committed against the same victim. On 12 July 2023, he was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term. A later slip-rule hearing clarified the intended minimum term after confusion in the prison estate. The appellant appealed against sentence, arguing that an extended sentence should have been imposed, that the notional determinate sentence was excessive, and that the judge had wrongly considered the facts of an earlier robbery. The central issue was whether a discretionary life sentence was justified by the continuing and unquantifiable risk to the public.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court upheld the discretionary life sentence, subject to amendments correcting the statutory references and minimum-term calculation in the court record.
2. The statutory criteria for dangerousness were satisfied on the facts of the index offences alone. The appellant’s offending was carefully planned and was not shown to be impulsive or caused by an external event.
3. An extended sentence would not adequately protect the public. The required long-term, trauma-focused psychological interventions could not be supplied by Probation during an extended licence period. It was uncertain whether treatment would be available, how long it would take to have an effect, or whether the appellant would ever cease to pose a serious danger. The period of risk therefore could not reliably be estimated, making a discretionary life sentence fully justified.
4. The sentencing judge was entitled to consider the facts of the earlier robbery because the appellant had pleaded guilty on a full-facts basis. The judge could draw the obvious inference that the appellant had embarked on that course of conduct intending to commit rape or sexual assault, although he ultimately desisted. A pre-credit sentence of 22 years was not manifestly excessive given the two category 1A offences, their sustained and aggravated nature, the striking similarity of the earlier offending, and the profound harm to the victim and her family.
5. When imposing a discretionary life sentence, it is desirable to calculate and state the minimum term in open court, as reiterated in R v Sesay [2024] EWCA Crim 483. The relevant provision was section 323 of the Sentencing Code, not section 240 ZA. The record was amended to state a minimum term of 9 years and 192 days. Section 274 of the Sentencing Act 2020 did not apply to this 39-year-old offender; the correct provision was section 285.

1. Crown Court at Nottingham. The appellant pleaded guilty and was sentenced on 12 July 2023 to life imprisonment with a minimum term. Following confusion about the term, the court held a slip-rule hearing on 24 July 2023 under section 385 of the Sentencing Act 2020.
2. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). On 30 January 2025, the court dismissed the appeal, subject to amendments to the court record. The decision is reported at [2025] EWCA Crim 115.