R v Jamie Edwin Barrow

In sentencing for multiple murders, the starting points in Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020 must guide, not dictate, the minimum term. They must not be applied mechanically as fixed categories. The court must assess the particular facts, aggravating and mitigating features, and seek consistency with comparable cases, while recognising that no two cases are identical. A mental disorder may remain relevant personal mitigation even where it does not reduce culpability. A 30-year starting point for particularly high seriousness can be adjusted substantially upwards or downwards. In this case, a 44-year minimum term was manifestly excessive; 38 years, less time on remand, was substituted.

The appellant was convicted at the Crown Court at Nottingham of three murders and arson, being reckless as to whether life was endangered, contrary to section 1(2) and (3) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971. Tipples J imposed concurrent life sentences with minimum terms of 44 years, less 224 days on remand, and a concurrent 10-year sentence for arson.

With leave, the appellant appealed against sentence. He challenged the treatment of his mental disorder, the findings concerning planning, his conduct after starting the fire and remorse, and the overall proportionality of the minimum term. The central issue was whether 44 years was manifestly excessive.

1. Disposition. The appeal was allowed in part. The minimum term for each murder was reduced to 38 years, less 224 days spent on remand. The sentences remained concurrent, and the concurrent 10-year sentence for arson was unchanged.
2. The sentence for murder is fixed by law as life imprisonment. The minimum term must reflect the seriousness of the offence and any associated offences under section 322 of the Sentencing Act 2020. Schedule 21 provides starting points, but they must not be used mechanically. The court must consider the particular facts, aggravating and mitigating features, and consistency with comparable cases. Schedule 21 provides no sentencing range, so a case attracting a 30-year starting point may require a significant adjustment upwards or downwards.
3. The judge was entitled to find that the appellant remained near the flat for about five minutes after starting the fire, that he could hear what was happening, that there had been some planning, and that his mental disorder did not reduce his culpability. The trial judge had seen the whole evidence and was better placed than the appellate court to assess those matters.
4. The judge was also entitled to find that the appellant had not shown full remorse. However, this was principally a lack of mitigation rather than an aggravating factor. The appellant’s mental health problems also had to be considered as personal mitigation, even though they did not reduce his culpability.
5. The court considered the guidance in R v Jones (Neil) and Others [2005] EWCA Crim 3115; [2006] 2 Cr App R (S) 19 and the comparable murder-arson sentences in R v Mahmud (Farhad) [2014] EWCA Crim 1008, Attorney General’s Reference (No 50 of 2013) (R v Mills) [2013] EWCA Crim 2573 and Attorney General’s Reference (R v Mohammed (Shahid)) [2020] EWCA Crim 766; [2020] 4 WLR 114. Those authorities demonstrated the need for consistency while recognising that each case turns on its facts.
6. A 44-year minimum term was manifestly excessive in the circumstances. A term of 38 years, less the period spent on remand, was appropriate. The minimum term was not necessarily the period actually to be served: release remained a matter for the Parole Board, with any release subject to lifelong licence.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — [2024] EWCA Crim 509: appeal against sentence allowed in part; minimum terms reduced from 44 years to 38 years, less 224 days on remand.
2. Crown Court at Nottingham — on 7 July 2023, Tipples J imposed concurrent life sentences with 44-year minimum terms for the three murders and a concurrent 10-year sentence for arson.