R v Amidu Koroma

For murder sentencing, Schedule 21 starting points must not be applied mechanically as fixed categories. The court must assess the individual circumstances and reach a minimum term that is just and proportionate. Aggravating and mitigating features may produce a term of any length.

Lies or attempts to blame another person are not aggravating merely because they deny responsibility. Wrongful blame that causes another person to suffer may make the offence more serious, depending on the facts. Where concurrent offences affect a life-sentence minimum term, totality requires the court to stand back and assess the overall sentence.

The appellant was convicted at the Central Criminal Court on 12 October 2023 of murdering his wife and committing arson. On 16 October 2023 he received a life sentence with a minimum term of 29 years, reduced by 537 days spent on remand, and a concurrent seven-year sentence for arson.

He sought an extension of time and permission to appeal against sentence. The issues were whether the murder minimum term was excessive, whether his trial defence wrongly blaming his teenage son was an aggravating feature, and whether insufficient effect had been given to totality.

Appeal allowed in part. The court granted the six-day extension and leave to appeal. It confirmed that a pre-sentence report was unnecessary.

1. Under section 322 of the Sentencing Act 2020, the minimum term for a sentence fixed by law must be specified with regard to Schedule 21. The statutory starting points are not separate mechanical categories. The court must consider the particular facts and aggravating and mitigating features to reach a just and proportionate term. This approach was reflected in R v Peters [2005] EWCA Crim 605, R v Jones (Neil) [2005] EWCA Crim 3115 and R v Barrow [2024] EWCA Crim 509.
2. The principle in R v Lowndes [2013] EWCA Crim 1747, confirmed in R v Norris [2024] EWCA Crim 68, is that merely lying or casting blame on another is not itself aggravating. The present case was distinguishable because the appellant went beyond denial and wrongly blamed his teenage son for a horrific murder, compounding the son’s grief and loss. The judge was entitled to treat that effect as aggravating.
3. The initial 26-year minimum term for murder was nevertheless too high. Significant planning was established, but an 11-year increase from the 15-year starting point was excessive. The seven-year arson sentence was properly concurrent. Applying totality required the court to stand back and ensure that the overall sentence was just and proportionate.
4. The notional minimum term was reduced from 29 years to 25 years. After deducting 537 days on remand, the minimum term was expressed precisely as 23 years, 6 months and 9 days, in accordance with R v Sesay & Ors [2024] EWCA Crim 483. The arson sentence remained unchanged and concurrent.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — [2024] EWCA Crim 1539: extension of time and leave granted; appeal allowed to the extent that the murder minimum term was reduced to 23 years, 6 months and 9 days. The arson sentence remained concurrent.
2. Central Criminal Court — conviction on 12 October 2023 and sentence on 16 October 2023: life imprisonment for murder with a 29-year minimum term less 537 days, and seven years’ imprisonment for concurrent arson.