Miah Ibar Lone v Michael Andreas Petrou

Permission to appeal requires a real prospect of success or another compelling reason. An appellate court reviews the decision below and will interfere with factual, case-management or costs decisions only on a stringent basis. A consent order may be challenged only for a legally recognised reason such as fraud, misrepresentation or mistake. The statutory one-fifth rule under the Solicitors Act 1974 applies to the overall bill presented, not selected components. Special circumstances must be significant and outside the ordinary run of cases, while preserving the statutory winner’s position. A second attempt to appeal an order after permission has already been refused is an abuse of process.

The claimant, a solicitor litigant, sought permission to appeal orders made by a costs judge concerning the assessment of his bills and the defendant’s costs. The principal challenges concerned the calculation of the one-fifth rule under the Solicitors Act 1974, alleged failures concerning the defendant’s retainer, proportionality, duplicated costs, bias and the assessment of costs under a consent order.

The claimant also sought, in substance, to reopen a 2017 order which had already been challenged unsuccessfully before Williams J in December 2019. The central questions were whether any ground had a real prospect of success, whether time should be extended for the earlier appeal, and whether the consent order could be set aside.

1. Permission test. Under CPR r.52.6(1), permission could be granted only if the proposed appeal had a real prospect of success or there was some other compelling reason for it. The claimant did not satisfy either limb.
2. Appellate restraint. The appeal was a review, not a rehearing. Findings of fact and discretionary case-management or costs decisions could be disturbed only where the lower court was plainly wrong, acted outside the generous ambit of discretion, or made an error of principle or omitted a material matter.
3. Consent orders. Grounds directed to orders made by agreement had no realistic prospect unless the claimant showed a legally recognised basis such as fraud, misrepresentation, mutual mistake or a similar vitiating circumstance. No such evidence was provided.
4. Earlier appeal. The attempt to challenge the 2017 order again, after permission had been refused by Williams J, was an abuse of process. Time was also refused because the application was years late, directions had not been complied with and no adequate explanation was given.
5. One-fifth rule. The court applied Wilson solicitors LLP v Bentine and Stone Rowe Brewer LLP v Just Costs Ltd. The statutory comparison was between the overall bill presented and the amount allowed on assessment. Special circumstances required something significant and outside the ordinary course. Beating the opponent’s offer was not equivalent to beating an offer made by the receiving party and did not justify departure from the statutory result.
6. The remaining grounds were unsupported by the appeal bundle, transcripts or reasoning from the lower court, or had not been raised below. They therefore had no realistic prospect of success.
7. Permission to appeal was refused on every ground, the extension of time was refused, the stay was terminated, the appeal was marked totally without merit, and costs were awarded to the respondent in the specified sums.

• High Court, King's Bench Division: Permission to appeal was refused on paper by Sir Stephen Stewart on 1 March 2023.
• High Court: Williams J refused permission in December 2019 in relation to the earlier challenge to the 2017 costs order. No neutral citation was stated.
• High Court, King's Bench Division: The present application was dismissed. The court refused permission on all grounds, refused an extension of time, terminated the stay and marked the appeal totally without merit.