Andrzej Freda v Bochum Local Court

Under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, the passage of time bars extradition only where it would be unjust or oppressive to return the requested person. The assessment is evaluative. Delay, prejudice, hardship and the gravity of the alleged offence must be considered together; seriousness is relevant but not automatically decisive.

General assertions about faded memories or unavailable evidence are insufficient. Specific evidence is required to show that delay would materially prejudice the defence. In an Article 8 proportionality assessment, delay may reduce the public interest in extradition, but its effect depends on the circumstances. On an appeal under section 26, the High Court asks whether the decision was wrong, respecting factual findings and focusing on the overall evaluative outcome.

The appellant appealed under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against a District Judge’s order for his extradition to Germany to face trial for murder. The alleged offence occurred in March 1996. Investigations continued, but the appellant was not identified as a suspect until a DNA match was obtained in 2020. An arrest warrant was issued in 2022.

The appeal alleged that extradition was unjust or oppressive by reason of delay under section 14, and that it would disproportionately interfere with the appellant’s Article 8 rights. The central issues were whether the delay caused sufficiently specific prejudice or hardship, and whether the District Judge’s overall proportionality assessment was wrong.

1. Appeal dismissed. Neither ground satisfied section 27 of the Extradition Act 2003. The appellant was not entitled to discharge or to have the extradition order quashed.
2. Section 14 requires an evaluative assessment of whether extradition would be unjust or oppressive by reason of delay. The distinction in Kakis v Government of the Republic of Cyprus between injustice, principally concerning prejudice to the defence, and oppression, principally concerning hardship caused by changed circumstances, remained applicable. The concepts may overlap.
3. Specific evidence was required to establish that records or witnesses had been lost or rendered unavailable. A general assertion based on common sense was insufficient. Following Pesut v Republic of Croatia, the passage of time, fading memories and possible loss of witnesses did not establish injustice without greater specificity.
4. The gravity of the alleged offence was relevant to oppression but was not determinative. The District Judge was entitled to distinguish the fraud allegation in R v Secretary of State ex parte Patel from the present murder allegation, particularly because the investigative delay was explained by the late DNA identification. The approach accorded with Ibrahim Koc v Turkish Judicial Authority.
5. The German court would have a clearer view of the available evidence and could protect the appellant’s fair-trial rights. The court was entitled to presume that Germany, as a Council of Europe country, could provide fair-trial and abuse-of-process safeguards, consistently with Woodcock v Government of New Zealand and Gomes v Government of Trinidad and Tobago.
6. For Article 8, the District Judge correctly used a balance-sheet approach. The strong public interest in extradition, mutual confidence between judicial authorities, the gravity of the alleged offence and the potential life sentence outweighed the appellant’s family ties, settled life, asserted health problems and delay. Applying Polish Judicial Authority v Celinski, the appellate question was whether the overall decision was wrong. The case was distinguishable from R v Lysiak.

1. High Court (Administrative Court) — [2024] EWHC 3065 (Admin): appeal under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 dismissed; the District Judge’s extradition order remained in force.
2. District Judge — judgment dated 29 September 2023: ordered extradition to Germany under section 21A(5) of the Extradition Act 2003.