Tyler Lukes v Kent & Medway NHS & Social Care Partnership Trust & Anor

On strike-out and summary-judgment applications, the court must be satisfied that a claim is certain to fail or has no realistic prospect of success. Where breach, clinical judgment or causation depends materially on disputed facts or expert evidence, determination without trial is generally inappropriate.

A police force owes a detainee a duty to take reasonable care for his safety, including in respect of omissions. The duty may be discharged by obtaining appropriate clinical attention under Code C. Police are generally entitled to rely on the attending healthcare professional’s assessment, unless exceptional circumstances trigger a further duty.

A detainee’s capacity or refusal to engage does not, without more, prevent possible compulsory detention under section 2 of the Mental Health Act 1983. The claim against the police was dismissed, but the clinical-negligence claim against the NHS Trust was allowed to proceed.

The claimant suffered severe injuries after jumping from a bridge onto railway tracks on 19 August 2020. He sued the NHS Trust responsible for mental-health services and the Chief Constable of Kent Police in negligence.

The claim alleged failures by NHS clinicians to obtain and assess his mental-health and self-harm history, and failures by the police during his detention on 11–12 August 2020 to identify his vulnerability, obtain appropriate clinical assessment and conduct an adequate pre-release risk assessment.

Both defendants applied under CPR r 3.4(2)(a) and CPR Part 24. The central issues were whether the pleaded breaches were legally arguable, whether the police had discharged their custodial duty by obtaining clinical attention from a community psychiatric nurse, and whether the NHS allegations and causation issues required trial evidence.

1. Disposition. The applications by the First Defendant were dismissed. Summary judgment and strike-out were granted in favour of the Second Defendant.

2. For strike-out, the court must be certain that the claim is bound to fail. For summary judgment, the question is whether the claimant has a realistic, rather than fanciful, prospect of success. The court must avoid a mini-trial, while considering both the evidence available and evidence reasonably expected at trial. Assertions that further evidence may emerge must be substantiated.

3. The police owed the claimant a duty of care while he was detained. That duty extended to acts and omissions and required reasonable care to avoid foreseeable injury. The relevant content of the duty was informed by Code C and professional guidance.

4. The initial failure to identify the claimant as vulnerable was arguably a breach, but it was remedied by the later reassessment, appointment of an appropriate adult, attendance by Mr Parish and legal representation. It therefore had no causative effect.

5. Mr Parish, a community psychiatric nurse, was a healthcare professional for Code C purposes. The police reasonably discharged their obligation to obtain appropriate clinical attention by arranging his attendance. They were entitled to rely on his screening and conclusions. Code C did not impose a general police quality-audit or review duty. An exceptional case might arise if the police knew that the healthcare professional had undertaken no meaningful screening, but that was not arguable on these facts.

6. The pre-release risk-assessment allegation was inadequately connected to causation. Any possible causative effect was in any event superseded by subsequent contact with mental-health services.

7. Against the NHS Trust, there were realistic prospects of proving that Mr Parish failed to ascertain the claimant’s full history of threatened self-harm and failed to obtain relevant information from his mother or GP. These matters were capable of affecting the screening assessment.

8. There were also triable allegations concerning Ms Hatfull’s incomplete and inaccurate screening record, including her failure to record relevant family history, previous suicide threats and risks to others. Capacity and refusal to engage did not by themselves resolve whether compulsory assessment or detention was warranted. Section 2(2) of the Mental Health Act 1983 is not confined to psychosis, and capacity is not an absolute bar to detention.

9. Breach and causation were interlinked. Expert evidence might establish that the claimant should have been compulsorily admitted by 12 or 15 August, in which event a triable issue would arise as to whether he would have been at liberty to injure himself on 19 August. The causation issues could not fairly be resolved summarily.