Huda Ammori, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

An application to deproscribe an organisation, with an appeal to POAC, is not an alternative remedy for challenging the lawfulness of the initial decision to proscribe it. Sections 4 and 5 of the Terrorism Act 2000 concern whether proscription should continue, not the validity or consequences of the original decision under section 3(3)(a). Even if the statutory route were available as an alternative remedy, judicial review could exceptionally proceed where a swift authoritative determination was required, particularly because criminal proceedings arose from the order. The seven-day limit in CPR 52.8 governed an application for permission to appeal against refusal of judicial-review permission, even where the application was filed in a respondent’s notice. Time was extended, and permission to apply for judicial review was granted on limited relevant-considerations and policy grounds.

Ms Ammori, a founder of Palestine Action, challenged the Secretary of State’s order adding the organisation to Schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000. The High Court held that deproscription under section 4, with an appeal to POAC under section 5, was not an adequate alternative remedy to judicial review of the initial proscription decision, and granted permission on two grounds: proportionality under Articles 10 and 11 and failure to consult.

The Secretary of State appealed against that preliminary ruling. Ms Ammori also sought permission to appeal the refusal of permission on grounds 1, 5, 6 and 7. The central issues were whether deproscription was an available or adequate alternative remedy, whether the application for permission was out of time, and whether time and permission should be granted.

1. Appeal dismissed. The statutory deproscription procedure was not intended to challenge the validity of the initial proscription order. Sections 3(3)(a) and 3(3)(b) of the Terrorism Act 2000 concern legally distinct decisions. Sections 4 and 5 address whether an organisation should remain proscribed, especially where circumstances have changed.
2. Section 7 was a strong indication of that legislative purpose. It permits challenges to convictions only for activity occurring on or after refusal of a deproscription application, and does not remove the consequences of an unlawful initial proscription. Parliament could not objectively be taken to have intended the statutory route to leave convictions based on an unlawful initial order in place until a later refusal date.
3. The ordinary rule remains that judicial review is a remedy of last resort where another remedy is conveniently and effectively available. The principle, reflected in Watch Tower [2016] EWCA Civ 154, Glencore [2017] EWCA Civ 1716 and Re McAleenon [2024] UKSC 31, respects statutory procedures established by Parliament. It did not, however, make deproscription an alternative remedy for the initial decision here.
4. Alternatively, the Judge was entitled to find the remedy inadequate on the facts. The need for an expeditious and authoritative decision, together with the prospect of numerous criminal proceedings arising from the order, justified judicial review. The different constitution of POAC and its slightly wider ability to consider closed material did not outweigh those considerations. The decision did not make sections 4 and 5 otiose.
5. The Court did not decide whether the Boddington principle [1999] 2 AC 143 would permit challenges of this kind in criminal proceedings. It held that the possibility of inconsistent criminal-court decisions was nevertheless a relevant factor supporting an early determination by the Administrative Court.
6. Any application for permission to appeal against refusal of permission to apply for judicial review, including refusal on particular grounds, must comply with CPR 52.8’s seven-day time limit. CPR 52.13 cannot be used to circumvent that limit by filing the application in a respondent’s notice.
7. The application was seriously out of time, but time was extended because the CPR provisions were unclear, there was no existing authority on the issue, delay had caused little additional prejudice, and there was a strong public interest in determining all arguable grounds promptly. Permission to apply for judicial review was granted on ground 5, limited to the matters in paragraph 82 of the amended grounds, and on ground 6. Permission was refused on grounds 1 and 7.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed the Secretary of State’s appeal against the High Court’s preliminary ruling. Granted an extension of time for Ms Ammori’s application and granted permission to apply for judicial review on limited ground 5 and ground 6, refusing permission on grounds 1 and 7.
• High Court, Administrative Court: Chamberlain J held that deproscription with an appeal to POAC was not an adequate alternative remedy and granted permission on grounds 2 and 8, refusing permission on the other material grounds: [2025] EWHC 2013 (Admin).
• Court of Appeal: refused permission to appeal against the refusal of interim relief: [2025] EWCA Civ 848. The High Court had refused interim relief: [2025] EWHC 1708 (Admin).