Sam Rice v R

A non-qualifying bail curfew gives no statutory entitlement to credit under section 325 of the Sentencing Act 2020. A sentencing court must nevertheless consider whether an adjustment is needed to produce a just and proportionate sentence.

That discretion is not confined to rare or exceptional cases. It must be exercised without mechanically replicating the statutory credit calculation. Relevant matters include the curfew’s restrictiveness and duration, the offender’s conduct and compliance, responsibility for delay, and the need to preserve the sentence’s punitive effect.

Sam Rice v R was an appeal against a total sentence of 30 months’ imprisonment imposed at Bradford Crown Court on 15 November 2024. The appellant had pleaded guilty to inflicting grievous bodily harm contrary to section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and two assaults by beating arising from a prolonged episode of violence in a bar.

While on bail, he spent 496 days subject to a 12-hour residence curfew with a requirement to present himself to a police officer if asked. It was not electronically monitored and therefore was not a qualifying curfew for the statutory credit scheme. The Recorder referred to the curfew but made no allowance and gave no reasons. The issue was whether, and to what extent, the sentence should reflect the non-qualifying curfew.

1. Appeal allowed to a limited extent. The Recorder had referred to the 496-day non-qualifying curfew but had not explained whether he had exercised the discretion to make an allowance, or the factors informing any refusal. The Court of Appeal therefore determined the issue afresh.

2. Section 325 of the Sentencing Act 2020 creates a mandatory credit scheme for electronically monitored qualifying curfews. It did not apply here. A court sentencing an offender who has spent time on a non-qualifying curfew retains a general discretion to impose a just and proportionate sentence. It must not treat the statutory formula as governing by analogy.

3. The discretion is not limited to rare or exceptional cases. The court followed the approach in R v Whitehouse [2019] EWCA Crim 970. It distinguished the observations in R v Prenga [2017] EWCA Crim 2149, which concerned custody under an unrelated European Arrest Warrant rather than a non-qualifying curfew. The exceptional-case observation in R v Cornelius [2019] EWCA Crim 2154 was surplus to that decision.

4. Relevant factors include the actual restriction imposed, its duration, any breach or other misconduct, particular hardship, whether the accused caused delay by failing to engage with the proceedings, and whether an adjustment would deprive the custodial sentence of its intended effect. A 12-hour curfew with a doorstep condition may justify consideration of an allowance, but most bail conditions will not.

5. The curfew here was lengthy and significantly restrictive, so some allowance was required. However, the appellant had materially contributed to delay by withholding acceptable pleas, and the serious offending required a substantial period of imprisonment. A three-month allowance achieved justice without reproducing the unduly generous statutory outcome. The 28-month sentence on count 5 was quashed and replaced by 25 months’ imprisonment; the two consecutive one-month terms remained. The total sentence was therefore reduced to 27 months.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): allowed the sentence appeal to a limited extent and substituted a total sentence of 27 months’ imprisonment: [2025] EWCA Crim 352.
• Bradford Crown Court: on 15 November 2024, Mr Recorder Gordon imposed a total sentence of 30 months’ imprisonment following guilty pleas.