Grzegorz Gorczyka v Regional Court of Krosno, Poland

In an extradition appeal under the Extradition Act 2003, the appellate court must decide whether the district judge was wrong, including whether the overall Article 8 proportionality evaluation was wrong. Findings of primary fact, particularly credibility findings based on oral evidence, ordinarily command respect and should be displaced only for clear error.

Fugitivity is assessed subjectively and by examining the totality of the person’s conduct. Fugitivity substantially reduces, but does not eliminate, the weight of delay. A non-qualifying electronically monitored curfew may contribute to the Article 8 balance, but does not ordinarily equate to credit against a sentence imposed by the requesting state. Article 8 will defeat extradition only in rare cases involving exceptionally severe interference with family life. The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed against an extradition order made by District Judge Snow at Westminster Magistrates’ Court on 14 January 2025. The order required his surrender to Poland to serve a 12-month custodial sentence for a violent offence committed in 2012.

Permission to appeal was granted only on Article 8 grounds. The issues were whether the appellant was properly found to be a fugitive, the significance of delay before certification of the warrant, and the effect of an electronically monitored curfew and fresh evidence concerning it. The High Court also reconsidered the overall Article 8 proportionality assessment in light of the circumstances at the appeal hearing.

1. Appeal test and factual findings. The appeal was governed by sections 26 and 27 of the Extradition Act 2003. Applying Love v USA [2018] EWHC 172 (Admin), the court could stand back and decide whether the district judge’s overall evaluation was wrong. It was not conducting a rehearing. Findings of primary fact, especially findings informed by oral evidence and credibility assessments, ordinarily had to be respected. The judge was entitled to find that the appellant had received notice of his trial and deliberately absented himself.
2. Fugitivity. The test was subjective and lacked a single prescriptive formulation. The court had to examine the totality of the individual’s conduct and ask whether it showed that he knowingly placed himself beyond the reach of the criminal justice system: Wisniewski v Poland [2016] EWHC 386 (Admin). The appellant left Poland knowing that he was required to attend his trial and failed to notify the authorities of his change of address. The finding that he was a fugitive was therefore correct. The lifting of a travel restriction did not prevent such a finding: Ristin v Romania [2022] EWHC 3163 (Admin).
3. Delay. Delay remained relevant to Article 8 even where the requested person was a fugitive. Fugitivity substantially reduced its weight but did not eliminate it, consistently with HH v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa [2012] UKSC 25. The unexplained delay in certification by the NCA remained relevant. Following Pabian v Poland [2024] EWHC 2431 (Admin), where no explanation for steps taken to execute a warrant was provided, the court could assume that none existed. The appellant nevertheless bore substantial responsibility for the overall delay.
4. Fresh evidence and curfew. The fresh evidence application was refused. Applying Hungary v Fenyvesi [2009] EWHC 231 and section 27(4) of the Extradition Act 2003, evidence had to be unavailable at the extradition hearing despite reasonable diligence and decisive in the sense that it would have required the appellant’s discharge. The curfew was a material Article 8 interference, but it was non-qualifying under sections 325 and 326 of the Sentencing Act 2020. It would not reduce the Polish sentence. It therefore had only a modest and non-decisive effect: R v Rice [2025] EWCA Crim 352.
5. Article 8 balance and disposal. The court undertook its own holistic proportionality assessment, applying Shvidler v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs; Dalston Projects Limited v Secretary of State for Transport [2025] UKSC 30 and the four-stage approach in Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No. 2) [2013] UKSC 38. The strong public interests in comity, deterrence and enforcing lawful sentences outweighed the Article 8 interference. The interference with family life was neither severe nor exceptionally severe. The fresh evidence application was formally refused and the appeal was dismissed.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal against the extradition order was dismissed. The fresh evidence application was refused.
• Westminster Magistrates’ Court: District Judge Snow ordered extradition on 14 January 2025.