Right Support Management Limited v The London Borough of Hillingdon

An appeal against a case-management decision is a review, not a rehearing. The appellate court should interfere only where the decision was wrong, unjust because of serious procedural irregularity, or outside the generous ambit of reasonable disagreement.

When deciding whether to permit a late amendment, the court must distinguish limitation-barred from in-time claims and assess whether the new claim arises from the same or substantially the same facts. Under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, relief from sanctions requires consideration of all the circumstances. Promptness is relevant, but there is no fixed period after which relief must be refused. Compliance is important, but it is not an end in itself.

The claimant appealed from orders made by HHJ Saunders in the Central London County Court on 12 August 2024. The judge refused permission to amend the particulars of claim and refused relief from the costs sanction imposed by CPR r.3.14.

The underlying claim concerned sums allegedly payable for accommodation, maintenance and care provided to a person receiving aftercare services under section 117 of the Mental Health Act 1983. The proposed amendment included a claim that accommodation and maintenance fell within that statutory duty.

The appeal concerned whether the amendment was a new claim, whether it arose from the same or substantially the same facts, the effect of limitation, and whether the refusal of relief from sanctions involved a material failure to consider relevant factors.

Appeal allowed on grounds 1 and 2. The orders refusing amendment and relief from sanctions were set aside.

1. Amendment. The proposed statutory claim was a new cause of action in relation to the earlier invoices. However, invoices from August 2018 onwards were within limitation when the application was made and had to be considered under CPR r.17.3. The judge wrongly treated the whole claim as statute barred.
2. The statutory claim arose from the same or substantially the same facts as the existing contractual and unjust-enrichment claims. The common facts included the claimant’s provision of supervised accommodation and care, the defendant’s admitted section 117 duty, the transfer of DB’s benefits, and the defendant’s failure to pay. The amendment added principally a legal argument about the scope of the existing duty.
3. The application was made before the CCMC, disclosure, exchange of evidence and trial listing. The asserted need to join an NHS body was unsupported and did not establish real prejudice. The amendment should therefore have been allowed for the in-time invoices and, applying the relevant factors, for the earlier invoices as well.
4. Accommodation under section 117. The prospects of the statutory claim were not plainly poor. The question whether Radnor House constituted ordinary or enhanced specialised accommodation required assessment of the evidence. Applying R (Afework) v Camden Borough Council, the relevant inquiry was whether the accommodation need resulted directly from the original condition, required enhanced specialised accommodation, and involved involuntary placement arising from that condition.
5. Relief from sanctions. At the third stage of Denton v White, the court must consider all the circumstances, including seriousness, consequences, promptness, other breaches, efficient and proportionate litigation, compliance with rules, and the principle that compliance is not an end in itself. The judge wrongly treated a four-month delay as effectively decisive and treated British Gas v Oak and Diriye v Bojaj as establishing a two-month rule. No such rule exists; each case is fact-sensitive.
6. Relief from the CPR r.3.14 sanction was granted. The claimant was ordered to pay the costs of both applications and was debarred from recovering 20% of its costs of the action, excluding costs already covered by an order.

• High Court (King’s Bench Division): appeal from orders of HHJ Saunders in the Central London County Court dated 12 August 2024. The orders refusing amendment and relief from sanctions were set aside, with substitute costs sanctions imposed.