Ionut-Dumitru Tudor v Tecuci District Court, Romania

In extradition proceedings, Article 8 does not require the appellate court to reweigh every factor considered by the district judge. Permission to appeal requires a reasonably arguable legal error, unreasonable factual finding, failure to consider a relevant factor, or irrationality. Delay is assessed by its effect on Article 8 rights, not by its mere duration, absent extraordinary circumstances such as discrimination or intentional delay. Article 8 will defeat the strong public interest in extradition only rarely. Interference with private life is generally insufficient without an exceptionally severe impact on family life.

The applicant sought permission to appeal against a District Judge’s order for his extradition to Romania to serve a two-year sentence for aggravated theft. The District Judge carried out an Article 8 assessment under section 21 of the Extradition Act 2003, taking account of the applicant’s residence and settled status in the United Kingdom, clean record, family circumstances and alleged delay in the Romanian proceedings.

Mrs Justice Eady refused permission on paper. The renewed application alleged insufficient weight had been given to those matters, an ineffective investigation and the applicant’s lack of fugitivity. The central issue was whether any of those matters disclosed a reasonably arguable error in the District Judge’s proportionality assessment.

1. Permission refused. The District Judge had properly balanced the applicant’s Article 8 rights against the strong public interest in extradition, including compliance with international treaty obligations and ensuring that a person convicted of a serious offence serves the sentence imposed.
2. The appellate court’s task was not to re-evaluate the weight given to competing factors. There had to be a reasonably arguable legal error, an unreasonable finding of fact, failure to consider a relevant factor, or an irrational or perverse conclusion. The applicant’s grounds amounted principally to an invitation to reassess weight.
3. Delay was relevant through its effect on Article 8 rights, rather than through its duration alone, unless extraordinary circumstances such as discrimination or intentional delay were shown. The District Judge had expressly found that there had not been lengthy delay in the domestic proceedings. Proceedings had commenced in January 2019, conviction had been reached by May 2024, and the arrest warrant had been issued promptly in August 2024.
4. The Supreme Court had made clear in Andrysiewicz v Circuit Court in Lodz, Poland [2025] UKSC 23 that cases in which Article 8 defeats the public interest in extradition are rare. Interference with private life was unlikely to suffice without evidence of an exceptionally severe impact on family life. That threshold was not met.
5. The District Judge was entitled to consider the applicant’s apparent knowledge of the proceedings, despite not finding to the criminal standard that he was a fugitive. No reasonably arguable ground of appeal was disclosed.

• High Court (Administrative Court): Permission to appeal refused on renewal, under [2025] EWHC 2221 (Admin).
• High Court (Administrative Court): Mrs Justice Eady refused permission to appeal on paper.
• District Judge: On 20 January 2025, ordered the applicant’s extradition to Romania.