Christo Gift and another v Dr Keith Rowley (Trinidad and Tobago)

An appellate court may overturn a trial judge’s primary factual findings only where satisfied that the judge was plainly wrong. It is insufficient that the appellate court would have reached a different conclusion. The appellate court must ordinarily assume that the trial judge considered the whole evidence and must respect the trial judge’s assessment of credibility, reliability and evidential weight. A judgment should not be subjected to narrow textual analysis; failure to discuss evidence in detail justifies intervention only where the conclusion is rationally insupportable.

In construing an agreement, the primary question is the parties’ objective common intention at the time of contracting. Earlier dealings may be relevant, but are secondary to the meaning of the later agreement.

The Gifts claimed specific performance of a 1998 agreement to sell the remaining lands at Alma Estate. The dispute was whether that description excluded only the 56.5 acres shown on the Farrell plan, or also an additional 29.1 acres identified in a later survey for Dr Rowley. Kangaloo J, in CV2009-00227, dismissed the claim and ordered repayment of the deposit. The Court of Appeal, by majority in Civil Appeal No T392 of 2017, overturned the factual findings and allowed the Gifts’ appeal; Lucky JA dissented. The issue before the Board was whether that intervention exceeded proper appellate restraint.

Appeal allowed. Lord Burrows gave the judgment of the Board.

1. The Court of Appeal correctly stated the need for restraint when reviewing findings of fact, but failed to apply that standard. The appellate court impermissibly substituted its own assessment of credibility and reliability for that of the trial judge.
2. The correspondence from 1980 and 1981 was important evidence which the trial judge should have considered and weighed. However, the Board rejected the finding that she had failed to do so. Her indirect reference to the correspondence, together with its prominence in cross-examination and her interventions, showed that she was alive to its relevance. Her reasons could have dealt with the correspondence more fully, but that did not establish that she had overlooked it or reached a rationally insupportable conclusion.
3. Kangaloo J was entitled to accept the evidence that a resurvey was required and that the Gifts knew of that requirement. Those were rational assessments of the evidence. The Court of Appeal was not entitled to reassess them merely because it preferred a different view. In this respect, the Board agreed with the reasoning of Lucky JA.
4. The central contractual issue was the objective common intention of Ms Latour and the Gifts when they entered into the 1998 Agreement. What had been agreed between Mr Latour and Dr Rowley in 1975 was relevant but secondary. Even if Ms Latour had been mistaken about the 1975 Agreement, the objective understanding of the parties to the 1998 Agreement remained decisive.

The appeal was allowed. The parties were invited to make submissions on the form of order within 28 days of promulgation, unless agreed.

• Privy Council: In [2025] UKPC 37, the appeal was allowed because the Court of Appeal had impermissibly substituted its assessment of the evidence for the trial judge’s rational findings.
• Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago: In Civil Appeal No T392 of 2017, the majority allowed the Gifts’ appeal and overturned the trial judge’s factual findings. Lucky JA dissented.
• Trial court: Kangaloo J, in CV2009-00227, dismissed the Gifts’ claim and ordered repayment of their deposit.