Brandon Duffy v BXTR 3 Ltd T/A House of Gods

For interim relief in a protected-disclosure dismissal claim, Employment Rights Act 1996, section 129(1), requires a claimant to show a pretty good chance of success. The tribunal must assess the available material summarily and expeditiously. The existence of factual or credibility disputes alone does not determine the application; the tribunal must assess how those disputes appear on the material before it. It should avoid findings that may constrain the tribunal deciding the merits, while giving the essential gist of its reasoning. If the tribunal fails to address important evidence, its reasons may be inadequate. Where correcting an error would require the EAT to make its own factual assessment, the matter must be remitted.

Brandon Duffy, who worked in the respondent hotel’s food and beverage team, applied for interim relief after his dismissal. He alleged that he had made a protected disclosure about fire escape doors and building security, and that the disclosure was the reason for his dismissal. The respondent disputed that he made a disclosure and said the dismissal decision pre-dated it and reflected his performance during probation.

The Glasgow Employment Tribunal refused interim relief, citing factual and credibility disputes. Duffy appealed, arguing that the tribunal had treated those disputes as determinative, overlooked a voice recording, and failed to give adequate reasons. The central issues were how a tribunal must assess disputed evidence on an interim-relief application and whether the EAT could determine the application itself.

1. Appeal allowed on Grounds 1 and 3; Ground 2 dismissed. The application for interim relief was remitted to the same employment tribunal.

2. Under section 129(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, “likely” means a pretty good chance of success, a substantially higher threshold than more likely than not. In a protected-disclosure case, the claimant must show a pretty good chance that the tribunal will find the disclosure, the claimant’s belief and its reasonableness, good faith, and that the disclosure was the principal cause of dismissal. The EAT endorsed paragraph 39 of the Presidential Guidance, including its observation that clear evidence may be needed to show that an apparently good, unrelated reason was not the real reason for dismissal. Interim relief is urgent and must be determined as soon as practicable; oral evidence is heard only if the tribunal decides to hear it.

3. The tribunal must make an expeditious, summary assessment of how the issues appear on the material available. It cannot refuse relief merely because facts and credibility are disputed. Its assessment should avoid findings that could tie the hands of the tribunal deciding the merits, and should explain the essential gist of its conclusion. The guidance in Al Qasimi v Robinson UKEAT/0283/17/JOJ and Dandpat v University of Bath UKEAT/0408/09 supported that approach. The tribunal erred by treating the disputes as determinative.

4. The recording did not make the tribunal’s decision perverse. A perversity appeal requires an overwhelming case that no reasonable tribunal, properly appreciating the evidence and law, could have reached the decision. Here the tribunal had made no finding about the reason for dismissal. However, the recording was important evidence that needed to be weighed. The tribunal’s failure to refer to and address it meant that its reasons were inadequate.

5. Under Jafri v Lincoln College [2014] EWCA Civ 449, the EAT cannot decide the merits by making its own factual assessment. As the EAT would have had to assess the evidence to decide the interim-relief application, it had to remit the matter. It was appropriate to remit it to the same tribunal.

1. Employment Appeal Tribunal: In Brandon Duffy v BXTR 3 Ltd T/A House of Gods [2026] EAT 119 , the appeal was allowed on Grounds 1 and 3 and dismissed on Ground 2. The interim-relief application was remitted to the same tribunal.
2. Glasgow Employment Tribunal: Refused the claimant’s interim-relief application in a judgment sent to the parties on 14 January 2026. No citation for that judgment is stated.