Emmah Muchererah v Rushcliffe Independent Hospitals (Kegworth) Ltd

A perversity appeal succeeds only where an overwhelming case shows that no reasonable tribunal, properly appreciating the evidence and law, could have reached its conclusion. The tribunal’s reasons must be read fairly as a whole; isolated infelicities or evidence supporting another inference do not suffice where its conclusion remains supported by the evidence. Under section 104(3) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, an employee must make reasonably clear which right was infringed. An unlawful deduction claim for additional pay turns on contractual entitlement, not simply the hours worked.

Emmah Muchererah, a nurse, was employed as Clinical Lead by Rushcliffe Independent Hospitals (Kegworth) Ltd from April 2020 until her dismissal in November 2020. She alleged that she was dismissed because of protected disclosures, a health-and-safety concern, or the assertion of rights under the Working Time Regulations 1998. She also claimed unpaid wages for additional and on-call hours.

Following a merits hearing in January 2023, the Employment Tribunal dismissed the claims. The EAT permitted three grounds of appeal to proceed, each challenging findings or conclusions as perverse in light of the evidence. The central issue was whether the tribunal’s decision could stand on the evidence before it.

The appeal was dismissed. The EAT applied the high threshold described in Yeboah v Crofton [2002] EWCA Civ 794 and [2002] IRLR 634, and Stewart v Cleveland Guest (Engineering) Limited [1996] ICR 535. A perversity challenge requires an overwhelming case that no reasonable tribunal, properly appreciating the evidence and law, could have reached the decision. Even grave doubts require great care. The tribunal’s reasons must be read as a whole, without an over-critical reading of isolated phrases.

1. Protected disclosures. The tribunal’s comments about the claimant’s written evidence were not a basis for finding perversity when read in context. It was open to the tribunal to find that she had not made the specific disclosure to Dr Singh identified at the preliminary hearing, and that her later account of a disclosure to the Trust did not establish one either. The evidence was disputed, and the tribunal’s overall reasoning was clear. General criticisms of Dr Okoko did not establish that either pleaded disclosure had been made. The tribunal also had an evidential basis for finding that the principal reason for dismissal was poor performance, and that Dr Okoko’s report was a reasonable assessment rather than a malicious one.
2. Health and safety and statutory rights. Evidence of long hours did not show that the claimant repeatedly raised the specific risks of driving tired or falling asleep on duty. The tribunal could find that she raised that concern once, that her manager proposed ways to address it, and that the concern was not in the respondent’s mind when it dismissed her. Under section 104(3) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, the claimant needed to make reasonably clear what right she said had been infringed. The evidence did not show that she connected her hours to the 48-hour limit. An earlier request for payment for working through a break, made while she was a bank nurse, did not establish that her later dismissal from the Clinical Lead role was for asserting a statutory right.
3. Wages. The claim depended on the claimant’s contractual entitlement to pay beyond her fixed salary, not simply on the hours she worked. The tribunal found that additional excessive hours could be claimed by timesheet and required approval for payment or time off in lieu, and that only one such timesheet was submitted and approved. The August supervision note stating an hourly rate did not undermine that finding, and the later email did not establish further authorised claims.

The EAT dismissed all three grounds and the appeal.

1. Employment Appeal Tribunal: Appeal dismissed on 9 September 2026: [2026] EAT 134 .
2. Employment Tribunal: Following a merits hearing at Leicester in January 2023, dismissed the complaints of automatic unfair dismissal and unlawful deduction from wages. No citation is stated in the judgment.