F v King's College London

An employment tribunal may refuse an amendment where it is not sufficiently clear and particularised to permit fair consideration, assessment of case-management consequences and identification of the complaint to be answered. A tribunal may allow clarification before deciding the application, but is not generally required to do so; the choice depends on the circumstances, including hardship and the overriding objective. A litigant in person must still identify the essential facts for each complaint. A lengthy narrative and lists of legal labels do not require the tribunal or respondent to reconstruct the case. Refusal does not automatically bar a later, properly particularised application; the relevance of an earlier refusal is fact-sensitive.

The claimant was employed by King’s College London on a fixed-term contract. In his first employment tribunal claim, he alleged numerous events over a lengthy period and cited several legal provisions. He later sought to add complaints under section 47B of the Employment Rights Act 1996, alleging detriment for making protected disclosures. The tribunal refused the amendment on 17 October 2022 because it did not identify the alleged detriments. It rejected his reconsideration application on 8 November 2022 because it supplied no missing particulars.

The claimant appealed both decisions. He argued that the tribunal had failed to apply the amendment principles and, alternatively, should have given him an opportunity to clarify his application. The central issues were whether the lack of particulars justified refusal and whether the tribunal was required to offer clarification before deciding the applications.

1. Both appeals were dismissed. A tribunal’s failure to cite the authorities on amendment is not, by itself, an error of law. The question is whether it took a substantively wrong approach, overlooked a relevant consideration, relied on an irrelevant one, or acted outside the range open to a tribunal applying the law.

2. A tribunal should not grant an amendment that it considers insufficiently particularised. That evaluative question is fact-sensitive. The proposal must be clear enough to permit fair consideration under the amendment guidance. As British Gas Services Limited v Basra (UEKAT/0194/14) and Remploy Ltd v Abbott and others (UKEAT/0405/14/DM) indicate, the tribunal should be able to assess the consequences of granting it, including for case management, and the respondent should be able to understand and defend the complaint. The principles in Selkent Bus Co Ltd v Moore ([1996] ICR 836) guide the overall decision.

3. A tribunal may allow an applicant to clarify or particularise a proposed amendment before deciding whether to grant or refuse it. That is an option, not a requirement. Amey Services Limited v Aldridge (UKEATS/0007/16/JW) and Chaudhry v Cerberus Security and Monitoring Services Limited ([2022] EAT 172) were read consistently with that discretion. Depending on the circumstances, clarification may be appropriate because refusal would cause undue hardship or because it serves the overriding objective. A tribunal may also conclude that there is no good reason to offer it, or that doing so would hinder the efficient management of the claim.

4. A case-management decision should generally not be reopened where the tribunal is asked to decide essentially the same matter afresh and there has been no material change in circumstances. The principle associated with Hart v English Heritage (UKEAT/0055/06) may not apply straightforwardly to a fresh application in overlapping, but non-identical, terms. The earlier refusal may form part of the relevant history, but does not automatically bar a later properly particularised application. The assessment remains fact-sensitive.

5. Here, the original claim’s references to victimisation, protected acts, whistleblowing and statutory provisions did not identify which communications were relied on as protected disclosures or which acts were said to be detriments on their grounds. The proposed amendment and reconsideration application did not cure that problem. A litigant in person is entitled to appropriate allowances, but must still convey the essential facts of each complaint; the tribunal and respondent need not reconstruct a claim from a lengthy narrative and scattered legal labels. Complaints under section 27 of the Equality Act 2010 and section 47B of the Employment Rights Act 1996 have different elements: a protected act is not necessarily a protected disclosure. The later refusal of a further application in 2025 did not make these appeals academic, since an earlier, properly framed application might have had a different outcome.

6. The claimant’s costs application concerning the respondent’s preparation of the appeal bundle also failed. Disagreement about documents to include was not, in the circumstances, unreasonable conduct warranting a costs award.

1. Employment Appeal Tribunal. On 23 September 2026, the EAT dismissed both appeals and the claimant’s costs application: [2026] EAT 146 .
2. Employment Tribunal. On 17 October 2022, the tribunal refused the amendment application for insufficient particulars. On 8 November 2022, it rejected the application to reconsider that refusal.