The Secretary of State for the Home Department v Huda Ammori, R (on the application of)

Reporting restrictions under section 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 are exceptional derogations from open justice. They require clear justification, strict necessity and use only as a last resort. The three-stage approach in R v Sarker [2018] EWCA Crim 1341 requires consideration of substantial prejudice, whether an order would eliminate that risk, less restrictive means, and the balance between fair trial and open justice. An order cannot be necessary where the material is already widely known and the trial process can safeguard fairness. Applications should be focused on particular material and brought before the court best placed to protect the trial.

This was an application during the Secretary of State’s appeal from the Divisional Court’s judgment, [2026] EWHC 292 (Admin), which had ruled the proscription of Palestine Action unlawful. The Crown Prosecution Service sought an order under section 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 postponing reporting of information concerning incidents in Bristol and Kent, and of the Home Secretary’s conclusion that those incidents constituted terrorism. The application sought to extend restrictions previously imposed by Chamberlain J. The central issue was whether postponement was necessary to protect ongoing criminal trials, having regard to open justice, existing publicity and safeguards directed by the trial judge.

Application refused. The court made no order postponing publication of material from the open part of the proceedings and discharged the relevant parts of the order made by Chamberlain J.

1. Applicable approach. Orders under section 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 are exceptional derogations from open justice and must be strictly necessary. Applying the approach in R v Sarker [2018] EWCA Crim 1341, the court considered whether reporting created a substantial risk of prejudice, whether an order would eliminate that risk, whether less restrictive means were available, and whether any remaining risk should be tolerated in the balance between fair trial and freedom of expression.
2. Material concerning the incidents. The information relied on to support restrictions concerning the planning, conduct or investigation of the Bristol and Kent incidents had not been mentioned in the appeal and was not likely to appear in the judgment. A reporting order in these proceedings should address only material arising in these proceedings. Any wider restriction should be sought in the relevant Crown Court. If particular prejudicial material in the Divisional Court’s judgment were identified, the proper course would be a focused application concerning that material.
3. Public knowledge and trial safeguards. The Home Secretary’s conclusion that the incidents satisfied section 1(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000, and the resulting proscription, were already widely known. No order could eliminate any risk of prejudice generated by those facts. The safeguards identified in Montgomery v HM Advocate [2003] 1 AC 641, including the trial judge’s directions and the jury’s obligation to decide the case on the evidence, were sufficient to secure fair trials.
4. Final directions. No particular fact arising from the advice given to the Home Secretary was shown to be so prejudicial that it required postponement. Fair and accurate reporting could explain the basis of the decision. Any application concerning particular material was to be focused and made within 48 hours of receipt of the judgment.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On the reporting-restriction application arising during the appeal, the court refused the application and discharged the relevant parts of Chamberlain J’s order.
• Divisional Court: The judgment under appeal, [2026] EWHC 292 (Admin), had ruled the proscription of Palestine Action unlawful. The Home Secretary appealed to the Court of Appeal.
• Administrative Court: In R (Ammori) v Home Secretary [2025] EWHC 2013 (Admin) at [77]-[80], permission was refused on a ground challenging the Home Secretary’s belief that the relevant incidents were acts of terrorism.