Huda Ammori, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Fairness does not invariably require advance notice and representations before the Home Secretary exercises the power to proscribe an organisation under Part II of the Terrorism Act 2000. The national-security context, statutory parliamentary procedure and practical risks may point decisively against such an obligation.

A proscription policy requiring proportionality is a qualitative threshold additional to the statutory belief that an organisation is concerned in terrorism. The organisation’s activities must be assessed by reference to terrorist activities, not its entire programme. Operational benefits arising automatically from proscription are not ordinarily relevant additional factors under that policy. A decision materially inconsistent with the policy is unlawful. The interference with Convention rights caused by proscription must nevertheless be justified by applying the four-stage proportionality test. The decision was disproportionate on the facts.

Huda Ammori, a co-founder of Palestine Action, sought judicial review of the Home Secretary’s decision to proscribe the organisation under section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000. The challenge concerned procedural fairness, relevant considerations, compliance with the Home Secretary’s proscription policy, and compatibility with articles 10, 11 and 14 of the Convention.

Permission had previously been granted on four grounds. The Court of Appeal had also held that an appeal to the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission against refusal of deproscription was not an alternative remedy for challenging the original proscription decision: [2025] EWCA Civ 1311. The central issues were whether the Home Secretary had acted fairly, followed her policy, and proportionately justified the interference caused by proscription.

1. Procedural fairness. No common-law duty required the Home Secretary to give a putative proscribed organisation advance notice or an opportunity to make representations. Fairness depends on all the circumstances. The national-security purpose of the power, the statutory order-making and affirmative-resolution procedure, the risks of disclosure or pre-emptive action, and the practical difficulty of identifying and consulting a broadly defined organisation pointed against supplementing the statutory scheme. Ground 8 failed.
2. Relevant considerations. The Home Secretary was entitled to conclude that the nature and scale of the terrorist activities and the specific threat to the United Kingdom supported proscription. Ground 5 therefore failed.
3. Policy. The policy’s reference to proportionality required a comprehensive qualitative assessment of the organisation, the consequences of proscription and the need for proscription. It did not require the Home Secretary to apply the court’s own Bank Mellat proportionality test. The policy’s reference to activities meant activities amounting to terrorism, not all activities undertaken by the organisation. Automatic operational advantages from sections 11 to 13 and the terrorist-property provisions were not relevant additional factors because they applied to every organisation meeting the statutory threshold and did not explain why this organisation particularly required proscription. Ground 6 succeeded.
4. Convention rights. Proscription was a specific executive measure, not a general legislative measure. It caused a very significant interference with articles 10 and 11. Article 17 could not be invoked merely because the organisation had been designated, while the legality of that designation was challenged. The interference was rationally connected to legitimate aims, and no proposed less intrusive measure was adequate. Applying the four-stage proportionality test, the small number and limited scale of terrorist acts, viewed against the available ordinary criminal law, did not justify the extensive consequences of proscription. Ground 2 succeeded. The decision was disproportionate and contrary to section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
5. Relief. The court rejected the submission under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 because it was not highly likely that the outcome would have been substantially the same without the policy error. Grounds 2 and 6 succeeded; Grounds 5 and 8 were dismissed. Subject to further representations on relief, the decision to proscribe Palestine Action was to be quashed.

• Court of Appeal: Permission to seek judicial review was granted on four grounds following [2025] EWCA Civ 1311. The court held that the deproscription appeal route under the Terrorism Act 2000 was not an alternative remedy for challenging the initial proscription decision.
• High Court (Administrative Court): Grounds 5 and 8 dismissed; Grounds 2 and 6 upheld. Subject to further submissions on relief, the proscription decision was to be quashed.