Gable Insurance AG v William Dewsall & Ors

Dishonesty requires the court first to ascertain the defendant’s actual knowledge or belief about the facts and then to assess the conduct by the objective standards of ordinary decent people. On appeal, a different assessment does not itself justify interference. The trial judge’s conclusion must disclose an identifiable error or be incapable of reasonable explanation or justification. Findings of dishonesty in other transactions do not compel the same finding for every breach of duty. A director’s belief in board authorisation and disclosure to auditors, together with an expectation of repayment and a personal guarantee, may support a finding that particular payments were not dishonest. Payments breaching an express trust may rationally receive a different assessment. These considerations support a permissible assessment rather than establish a general exemption from dishonesty.

Gable Insurance AG, a Liechtenstein insurance underwriter, was owned by Gable Holdings Inc. William Dewsall was a director of both companies and the group’s chief executive. He also wholly owned and controlled Hogarth Underwriting Agency Limited, which provided underwriting and claims handling services to the insurer. Hogarth operated trust accounts containing money beneficially owned by the insurer.

Excessive payments to Hogarth, partly benefiting Mr Dewsall, produced indebtedness of £3,239,721. Some payments came from the trust accounts and others directly from the insurer’s bank accounts. Following the insurer’s insolvency, it brought proceedings against Mr Dewsall and others. In [2025] EWHC 2280 (Ch), the deputy judge found breaches of directors’ duties under Liechtenstein law and awarded £4,957,788.52 against Mr Dewsall. He found dishonesty in several transactions, including the excessive payments from trust accounts, but declined to find dishonesty concerning the remaining excessive payments of £1,709,721.

That distinction mattered because Mr Dewsall had been made bankrupt. Section 281(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986 preserves liability for bankruptcy debts incurred in respect of fraud or fraudulent breach of trust despite discharge. The insurer appealed solely against the absence of a dishonesty finding concerning the excessive payments made directly from its bank accounts.

Appeal dismissed. Newey LJ delivered the leading judgment, with which Asplin and Baker LJJ agreed.

1. The dishonesty test in Ivey v Genting Casinos UK Ltd [2017] UKSC 67, [2018] AC 391 required two stages. The court first established the defendant’s actual knowledge or belief about the facts. It then assessed the conduct by the objective standards of ordinary decent people. The deputy judge had expressly identified that test and applied both stages. His conclusion summarised Mr Dewsall’s beliefs and then assessed his conduct objectively (paras 26, 35–36).

2. The appellate question was whether the conclusion was open to the deputy judge. A different view of the evidence or assessment would not suffice. Under Henderson v Foxworth Investments Ltd [2014] UKSC 41, interference with factual findings required an identifiable error or a decision incapable of reasonable explanation or justification. Evaluative assessments similarly required unreasonableness or an identifiable flaw undermining the conclusion (paras 28–30, 38–40).

3. The deputy judge’s findings that Mr Dewsall believed the payments had board authorisation and had been disclosed to the auditors were unchallenged. He also expected Hogarth’s indebtedness to be repaid and had given a personal guarantee. In those circumstances, the deputy judge could reasonably reject dishonesty concerning the payments made directly from the insurer’s accounts. This upheld a permissible assessment of the particular conduct, despite the established breaches of duty (paras 39–41).

4. Dishonesty established in other transactions did not compel a finding of dishonesty throughout. Rational distinctions could be drawn between those transactions and the direct payments. In particular, payments from the trust accounts breached an express trust and could rationally be treated differently (paras 41–43).

5. A judgment’s structure need not follow a prescribed form. The placement of the deputy judge’s overall conclusion before his discussion of other dishonest conduct did not demonstrate error. Nor did his emphatic description of dishonesty as impossible alter the appellate question. The court was therefore not entitled to interfere, and the existing judgment stood (paras 37, 40, 43–46).

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2026] EWCA Civ 851 , unanimously dismissed the insurer’s appeal against the refusal to find dishonesty concerning excessive payments made directly from its bank accounts.
• High Court, Business and Property Courts, Business List (ChD): Robin Vos, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, gave judgment in [2025] EWHC 2280 (Ch) . He found breaches of directors’ duties under Liechtenstein law. His order of 28 November 2025 awarded £4,957,788.52 against Mr Dewsall and identified £3,247,977.52 as arising from fraud or fraudulent breach of trust.