Shawn Runakl Delecia v R

A judge faced with a possible jury irregularity must use Criminal Practice Direction 8.7 as structured guidance, but it does not prescribe a single response. Whether an irregularity has arisen, and what action is required, involve careful case-specific judgment. There is no automatic duty to investigate a juror’s note or question jurors, even where bias is suggested. Jury deliberations remain confidential, subject to narrow exceptions for repudiation of the oath or extraneous material. The safety question is whether there is a real possibility or risk that the jury is biased and unable to reach a proper verdict. Here, the ambiguous reference to preconceptions, the surrounding circumstances and a firm legal direction made further inquiry unnecessary.

The applicant was convicted by a majority of 10 to 2 at the Crown Court at Southampton of rape and was sentenced to seven years and three months’ imprisonment. During deliberations, a juror sent the judge a note referring to uncertainty and possible preconceptions among the jury. The defence argued that Criminal Practice Direction 8.7 and Momodou and Limani [2005] EWCA Crim 177 required an inquiry into possible prejudice. The prosecution submitted that the judge retained discretion and that his further direction was sufficient. The central issue was whether the failure to question the juror rendered the conviction unsafe.

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

1. Criminal Practice Direction 8.7 is an essential tool that provides structure and guidance when a possible jury irregularity arises. It is not a straitjacket. Whether the judge has become aware of an irregularity may itself involve a question of degree and judgment.
2. The trial judge’s discretion means the careful exercise of judgment, not an unrestricted personal choice. The judge must decide what response the facts require, with regard to the fairness of the trial. The Practice Direction does not impose an unequivocal obligation to segregate or question jurors. A further direction may suffice. This approach was supported by Smith and Mercieca [2005] UKHL 12, Momodou and Limani [2005] EWCA Crim 177 and R v KK [2019] EWCA Crim 1634.
3. Jury deliberations are confidential and ordinarily cannot be investigated or made the subject of evidence. The narrow exceptions are a complete repudiation of the jury’s oath and the introduction of extraneous material. The court relied on Ellis v Deheer [1922] 2 KB 113, Smith and Mercieca [2005] UKHL 12 and Saad Essa [2023] EWCA Crim 608.
4. The safety question was whether there was a real possibility or risk that the jury was biased and unable to reach a proper conclusion in accordance with its duty and oath, as explained in Porter and Magill [2002] 2 AC 357 [2001] UKHL 67. The assessment was fact-sensitive. The reference to preconceptions was ambiguous, the juror showed no personal prejudice, the note arose at the end of a demanding week, and the jury received a firm direction to apply the law and avoid stereotypes. The contrast with the clearer circumstances in Cepe [2025] EWCA Crim 1634 reinforced that conclusion.
5. The judge had effectively isolated the jury, consulted counsel, considered the written defence submissions and assessed the basic facts. His decision to give a further direction rather than conduct an inquiry was within the proper exercise of judgment. There was no jury irregularity and no basis for concluding that the conviction was unsafe.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Leave to appeal against conviction was refused on 21 January 2026. Reasons were given in [2026] EWCA Crim 42.
• Crown Court at Southampton: The applicant was convicted on 3 March 2025 and sentenced on 21 March 2025. No separate citation is stated in the judgment.