R v Ashley Boyce

Crim PD 8.7 provides structure and guidance, not a rigid prescription. A trial judge retains a fact-sensitive discretion when a jury irregularity arises, but must exercise care and judgment with primary regard to the impact on trial fairness. The judge should ordinarily consider isolation, consult advocates, take provisional measures, establish the basic facts, consult again, and decide whether to continue, discharge a juror, or discharge the whole jury. Where friction is caused by threatening or abusive conduct by one juror, rather than disagreement about the evidence or bias, and enquiries show that the remaining jurors can continue safely, discharging that juror rather than the whole jury may be proper. A minor procedural imperfection does not necessarily make convictions unsafe where the essential facts are established and counsel can make submissions.

Following a trial at Snaresbrook Crown Court, the appellant was convicted of rape and various sexual, violent and firearms offences. During deliberations, one juror behaved abusively and threatened another juror. The trial judge initially directed the jury to continue after giving guidance, then discharged the offending juror after further complaints and an enquiry of the jury. The remaining jurors returned further verdicts.

After leave to appeal was granted on two grounds, the appellant challenged the judge’s handling of the alleged jury irregularities. The issues included the adequacy of the investigation and consultation process, the failure to isolate jurors, and the decision to discharge the juror without an overnight adjournment. The central question was whether the judge’s approach created an unacceptable risk to the fairness of the trial and rendered the convictions unsafe.

1. Appeal dismissed. The convictions were not rendered unsafe by the trial judge’s handling of the friction among the jurors.
2. Crim PD 8.7 requires a judge to address the prescribed steps when a possible jury irregularity arises, but it provides a structured and fact-sensitive discretion rather than a straitjacket. The judge must exercise care and judgment, giving primary regard to the impact of the irregularity on trial fairness. This was consistent with Shawn Runakl Delecia [2026] EWCA Crim 42 and KK [2019] EWCA Crim 1634.
3. On the first day, the judge acted within that discretion. The juror at the centre of the altercation was isolated by court staff, deliberations were stopped, the jury was sent home, written accounts were obtained, and counsel were consulted. The following morning, it was open to the judge to regard the available accounts as sufficient to establish the basic facts and to invite the jury to continue after appropriate guidance. The judge was not bound to adopt counsel’s proposed questions.
4. Although it would have been preferable to disclose the exact wording of the juror’s note before giving the guidance, the judge disclosed its gist and provided fuller information immediately afterwards. Counsel remained able to make submissions. There was no allegation of bias or suggestion that the friction arose from differing views about the evidence.
5. After a further complaint that Juror 3 had threatened violence, the judge consulted counsel, asked the jury whether it could continue as a body, and received a clear response that the remaining jurors could deliberate safely without Juror 3. In those circumstances, it was proper to discharge that juror rather than the whole jury. Continuing with him was unrealistic, while discharging the whole jury would have required a retrial without justification.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — Leave to appeal was granted on two jury-irregularity grounds. The appeal against conviction was dismissed: [2026] EWCA Crim 693.
• Crown Court at Snaresbrook — The appellant was convicted after trial and received an extended sentence of 23 years.