Christopher Ness v Jennifer Miller

A claim in false imprisonment against a complainant requires more than proof that the complaint triggered an arrest. The pleaded case must show that the defendant went beyond giving information and directed, procured, requested or directly encouraged the arrest. A report of alleged criminal conduct does not itself remove the police’s discretion to investigate and decide whether to arrest.

Serious allegations of unlawful means conspiracy must be pleaded with particularity and supported by evidence giving the claim a realistic prospect of success. A party cannot use amendment to re-open factual findings already made in the proceedings. Joinder remains discretionary, even where the formal conditions in CPR 19.2 are arguably met.

The claimant brought proceedings concerning publications and his arrest and detention by Surrey Police. The libel claim against the first defendant had previously been dismissed in [2025] EWHC 1784, after the court found that she had neither caused nor procured publication of the England Athletics emails.

The claimant sought to maintain false imprisonment and data protection claims against the first defendant and to amend his claim to join three further defendants. The proposed amendments included false imprisonment, unlawful means conspiracy and data protection claims. The court had to decide whether the existing claims should be struck out and whether the proposed parties and causes of action should be added.

1. False imprisonment against D1. The court proceeded on the assumption most favourable to the claimant: that the principle in Davidson applied and that witness immunity did not prevent the claim being considered at strike-out stage. The relevant question was whether the pleaded case showed that D1 went beyond giving information to police for them to act as they thought fit, and instead directed, procured, requested or directly encouraged the arrest. The pleading contained no such allegation.
2. A report to police ordinarily imposes a duty to investigate and take appropriate action, not a duty to arrest. The fact that the report concerned serious criminal conduct, or that the arrest would not have occurred without it, did not establish procurement. The pleaded allegation that the report was deliberately false was also unparticularised. The claim disclosed no reasonable grounds under CPR 3.4(2)(a), and there was no realistic basis for permitting a further amendment.
3. Data protection claim against D1. The only pleaded basis was that D1 had processed and disseminated personal data contained in the England Athletics emails. That case depended on factual allegations rejected in the earlier Libel Judgment. The proposed alternative “custodian” case was neither pleaded nor properly particularised and identified no relevant statutory duty. The claim was struck out under CPR 3.4(2)(a) and/or (b).
4. Proposed claims against D2–D4. The proposed false imprisonment claim was parasitic on the defective claim against D1 and pleaded no independent acts. The conspiracy claim failed to identify the agreement, concerted unlawful conduct, the defendants’ individual roles, or the factual basis for dishonesty. It also lacked evidence giving it a realistic prospect of success. The CPR 19.2 conditions and the court’s discretionary case-management requirements were not satisfied.
5. Data protection claim against D4. D4’s processing of the claimant’s personal data was at least arguable, and disputed factual issues could not be resolved summarily. Nevertheless, joinder was not desirable. The proposed claim was modest, lacked pleaded loss or damage, required substantial further amendment, and had no proper basis for remaining in the High Court. The applications were refused and the proceedings were struck out, subject to consequential submissions including costs.

The earlier libel claim was dismissed by the High Court in [2025] EWHC 1784. The judgment states that the dismissal had not been appealed. The present judgment determined subsequent strike-out and amendment applications in the same proceedings.