Ali v Heart of England NHS Foundation Trust & Anor

False imprisonment liability does not arise merely because a person gives mistaken information to the police which leads to an arrest. The claimant must show that the defendant went beyond providing information and directed, requested or directly encouraged the arrest, thereby making the police the defendant’s agent or procuring them to act. A good-faith informer is not liable merely because arrest was practically inevitable. The focus is on what the defendant did, not on whether the police felt compelled to act or exercised an independent discretion. Deliberately inventing a serious allegation, or taking a step known to be necessary to cause an arrest, may amount to procurement.

Mr Ali claimed damages for negligence against Heart of England NHS Foundation Trust and G4S Secure Solutions UK Ltd, and for false imprisonment against G4S. Following a three-day trial, the County Court dismissed both claims. The appeal concerned only the dismissal of the false imprisonment claim.

A G4S security officer mistakenly told the police that Mr Ali’s daughter was subject to a child protection order. The police arrested Mr Ali, later re-arresting him for neglect, and released him without charge. The central issue was whether the security officer’s call went beyond the provision of information and procured Mr Ali’s arrest.

1. The appeal was dismissed. The trial judge had applied the correct legal test and had correctly concluded that the false imprisonment claim was not made out.
2. False imprisonment is a trespass to the person. Where the defendant did not personally imprison the claimant, liability depends on accessory responsibility for the arrest. Following Davidson v Chief Constable of North Wales [1994] 2 All ER 597, the question is whether the defendant merely laid information before the police for them to act as they saw fit, or went further by directing, procuring, requesting or directly encouraging the arrest.
3. The test does not require the court in every case to determine whether the police officer actually felt able to exercise a discretion, or whether the officer in fact regarded arrest as compulsory. The relevant question is whether the defendant’s conduct made the police the defendant’s agent or procured them to act as they did.
4. Good faith is not a formal element of the tort, but it may be important to the factual assessment. A person who deliberately invents a serious allegation, or who knowingly takes a step which will cause an arrest, may procure the arrest. By contrast, a person who merely gives mistaken information in good faith does not incur liability, even where arrest is likely to follow.
5. The cases relied on by the appellant did not alter the principle in Davidson. Ahmed v Shafique [2009] EWHC 618 (QB) illustrated procurement where the defendant repeated an allegation knowing that this was the step required for arrest. Barkhuysen v Hamilton [2016] EWHC 2858 (QB) involved materially different facts, including an invented and emotionally charged allegation intended to procure action.
6. On the facts, the security officer reported information said to have come from warders, did not state that he knew it to be true, and did not expressly or implicitly request an arrest. The mistake about the child protection order was not presented in a manner amounting to direct encouragement. The officer therefore merely provided information and did not procure Mr Ali’s arrest.

• High Court (Chancery Division): appeal from the County Court at Birmingham dismissed. Permission to appeal had been granted by Morris J on 7 July 2017.
• County Court at Birmingham: after a three-day trial, the negligence and false imprisonment claims were dismissed. The judgment was given on 27 April 2017 following the order of Upper Tribunal Judge Allen dated 10 May 2017.