Carmen Castro Guallichico, R (on the application of) v The London Borough of Southwark

Housing allocation policies must be followed unless there is a good reason to depart from them, and they should be read practically and flexibly. A direct-offer scheme may use the date an applicant is accepted as a starting point while permitting priority to be enhanced for urgency, where that is what the procedure provides. A lack of detail about how discretion is exercised, although undesirable, does not by itself make an allocation scheme unlawful. The public sector equality duty requires conscientious attention to equality considerations in the decision-making process; it does not impose a free-standing duty to collect and monitor data in every case.

The claimant’s family lived in a two-bedroom flat which was unsuitable for their needs, including the needs of two children with autism and complex needs. Southwark principally allocated housing through choice-based lettings, with direct offers available to applicants in urgent need. Its internal procedure placed accepted households on a direct-offer list by date, while allowing senior officers to enhance priority according to urgency.

The claimant said her changing position on the list and offers to households with shorter waiting times showed that the procedure had been breached. She also challenged the lack of published criteria for enhanced priority and alleged a breach of the public sector equality duty. Permission was granted on all three grounds. The central issues were whether Southwark had departed from its procedure, whether the available information made the scheme unlawful, and whether it had discharged its equality duty.

1. Claim dismissed. Under Part VI of the Housing Act 1996, authorities have wide discretion over allocations, subject to their statutory duties and their own scheme. A public authority must follow its policy unless there is a good reason not to. Housing allocation schemes are read practically and with sensible flexibility, rather than legalistically: R (Ariemuguvbe) v Islington LBC [2009] EWCA Civ 1308 and R (Flores) v Southwark LBC [2020] EWCA Civ 1697.

2. The published scheme did not require direct offers to be made in strict date order. Read with the internal procedure, it provided for date-based priority, with enhanced priority available according to urgency. Direct offers were a discretionary route for varied, urgent cases, and the suitability of a particular property also mattered. The claimant did not establish that Southwark had breached its procedure.

3. The scheme identified circumstances in which direct offers could be made, but did not state criteria for enhancing priority. It would have been desirable to provide the claimant with more information. However, the absence of further detail did not itself make the scheme unlawful. The court accepted that authorities need discretion when allocating scarce housing amid uncertainty about vacancies and applicants’ needs. As in R (Babakandi) v Westminster CC [2011] EWHC 1756 (Admin) and R (Willott) v Eastbourne BC [2024] EWHC 113 (Admin), the possibility of greater transparency did not establish unlawfulness.

4. The public sector equality duty concerns the lawfulness of the decision-making process. It requires proper and conscientious attention to the statutory equality considerations, but does not permit the court to substitute its view of the weight they deserve. Southwark had conducted an equality impact assessment that included the direct-offer process, monitored the scheme annually and direct offers monthly, and had collected data on protected characteristics. The court was not satisfied that the claimant had shown a breach.

5. R (RR) v Enfield LBC [2025] EWCA Civ 1390 confirmed that there is no free-standing obligation to collect and monitor data to comply with the duty. R (DXK) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Rev1) [2024] EWHC 579 (Admin) was distinguishable on its facts. The claimant’s household had been disadvantaged, but the material did not establish that disabled households more generally were disadvantaged or that this resulted from a failure to discharge the duty.

All three grounds failed. The court did not consider relief.