RR, R (on the application of) v The London Borough of Enfield

Indirect discrimination requires evidence that a provision, criterion or practice causes a particular disadvantage to the protected group compared with the comparator group. General evidence of poor conditions is insufficient. Under section 136, the claimant must establish primary facts from which discrimination could be inferred. The same evidential threshold applies to a reasonable-adjustments claim. Where a lawful housing allocation scheme prescribes priorities, departing from it to give additional priority is not a reasonable adjustment. The public sector equality duty is tied to the function being exercised and creates no free-standing duty to monitor or collect statistics, although information-gathering may be necessary when reviewing a policy. An appeal remains live where statutory review and damages issues remain unresolved.

RR and his family were homeless and owed the main housing duty under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996. Enfield’s Part VI allocation scheme awarded homeless households 200 points but excluded them from additional points for low or medium health and wellbeing needs. RR alleged indirect discrimination, failure to make reasonable adjustments and breach of the public sector equality duty under the Equality Act 2010.

The High Court dismissed the discrimination claims, found a breach of the public sector equality duty based on failure to monitor and record statistics, but refused relief under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981: [2024] EWHC 2501 (ADMIN). The appeal concerned academicity, evidential burdens, admissibility of evidence, reasonable adjustments and the scope and remedy of the equality duty.

The Court of Appeal, with Lord Justice Lewis giving the judgment and Lady Justice Whipple and the Master of the Rolls agreeing, dismissed the appeal and upheld the respondent’s notice.

1. Academicity. The appeal remained live. The appellant’s suitability review under section 202 of the Housing Act 1996 was unresolved, with a possible county-court appeal under section 204. If the accommodation was unsuitable, the main housing duty could continue. The claim for discrimination damages also remained to be determined.
2. Indirect discrimination. Section 19 requires comparison between the protected and comparator groups, proof of particular disadvantage, proof that the individual suffered that disadvantage, and consideration of justification. The claimant must also establish a causal link between the PCP and the disadvantage. There was no statistical or other evidence comparing waiting times for homeless households with and without disabled members. The documents relied upon concerned the quality of Part VII temporary accommodation, not comparative waiting times for Part VI housing. They were therefore irrelevant and were properly excluded. There was also no evidence that exclusion from the additional 50 or 150 points caused the alleged delay; the evidence instead pointed to the shortage of suitable properties.
3. Reasonable adjustments. The same evidential deficiency defeated the section 20 claim. In any event, giving additional priority outside the respondent’s lawful allocation scheme would not have been a reasonable adjustment. Section 166A(14) of the Housing Act 1996 required housing to be allocated in accordance with that scheme.
4. Public sector equality duty. Section 149 is function-specific. The court must identify the function being exercised and ask whether due regard was given to the specified equality considerations. It creates no free-standing duty to monitor or collect statistics. Monitoring may be necessary when a public body reviews a policy and lacks sufficient information, as illustrated by R (Ward) v Hillingdon London Borough Council [2019] EWCA Civ 692. R (DXK) and R (DMA) were distinguishable because they concerned accommodation duties discharged through contractors and the need to monitor compliance with relevant timescales. Enfield had conducted an equality assessment when adopting the scheme, and the reviewer considered the appellant’s disability-related arguments and applied the scheme. There was therefore no breach.
5. Remedy. If there had been a breach, section 31(2A) would have required relief to be refused because it was highly likely that the review decision would have been the same. The court applied the approach in R (Bradbury) v Brecon Beacons National Park Authority [2025] EWCA Civ 489 and R (Greenfields (IOW) Ltd) v Isle of Wight Council [2025] EWCA 488.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division). Appeal dismissed, respondent’s notice upheld and applications to dismiss the appeal as academic and to adduce new evidence refused: [2025] EWCA Civ 1390.
2. High Court of Justice, King’s Bench Division, Administrative Court. HHJ Walden-Smith dismissed the discrimination claims, found a breach of section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 based on failure to monitor and record statistics, but refused relief under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981: [2024] EWHC 2501 (ADMIN).