Fairmont Residential Limited v North Central London Integrated Care Board

On an appeal from strike-out and summary judgment, a restitutionary claim for the unpaid value of services should proceed where properly pleaded facts and evidence give it a real, not fanciful, prospect of success. The objective value of services is what a reasonable recipient in the defendant’s position would have paid in the relevant market. A long-term contractual benchmark does not necessarily determine the value of short-term, out-of-contract services. Substantial part-payment does not itself defeat a claim if it may fall below that objective value. Where the market rate and the recipient’s acceptance of continuing services are disputed, those questions may require trial. The court should not conduct a mini-trial or disregard relevant expert and factual evidence at the interlocutory stage.

Fairmont Residential Limited v North Central London Integrated Care Board concerned residential care provided to WG, a person with complex needs. The claimant had provided the accommodation and care under annual contracts. After the contract ended in November 2023, WG remained with the claimant while the defendant sought another placement. The claimant invoiced at a higher out-of-contract rate; the defendant continued paying the former contractual rate for a time and then stopped.

A Deputy Master struck out the unjust enrichment claim and entered summary judgment for the defendant. He considered the pleadings inadequate and the evidence insufficient to show that the defendant had received less than the market value of the services. The appeal concerned whether the claim was adequately pleaded and whether the evidence gave it a real prospect of success.

The appeal was allowed on all grounds. The claim for unjust enrichment had been adequately pleaded, and the Deputy Master was wrong to strike it out or grant summary judgment.

1. Appeal and interlocutory standards. Under CPR r. 52.21 an appeal is ordinarily a review, not a rehearing. The trial-specific deference applied to findings made after hearing live evidence did not apply because the Deputy Master had decided the applications on written evidence without witnesses. A strike-out application under CPR r. 3.4 generally requires the court to accept pleaded facts as true unless they are contradictory or obviously wrong. A claimant seeking to resist summary judgment must show a real, not fanciful, prospect of success.
2. The market evidence. The Deputy Master wrongly treated the CareCubedCalculator figure as determinative and confused the annual, in-contract rate with the market for short-term, out-of-contract care. The evidence that providers charged uplifted rates after termination, and that WG’s complex needs and uncertain placement affected staffing costs and available alternatives, was relevant. The expert’s evidence and Mr MacDonald’s evidence should not have been rejected at this stage. The Deputy Master also erred by relying on unsupported assertions and opinion from the defendant’s solicitor. CPR PD32 para. 18.2 requires a witness to identify matters based on information or belief and their source. The solicitor could give evidence of meetings she attended, but lacked relevant expertise or personal knowledge to prove care needs or market rates.
3. Unjust enrichment and valuation. The five elements include enrichment, enrichment at the claimant’s expense, unjust retention, absence of a defence or bar, and the value of the enrichment. The objective measure for services is what a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have paid, taking account of the cost and availability of alternatives, prevailing market rates and relevant objective circumstances. A benchmark for annual services need not establish the value of temporary services. Whether the fees paid represented the objective market value was a matter for trial. The fact that substantial sums had been paid did not make an unpaid balance legally unclaimable.
4. Benefit and free acceptance. It was at least arguable that care provided to WG could enrich the defendant because the defendant had a statutory duty to provide and fund that care under the National Health Services Act 2006. The claimant had pleaded that the defendant knew the claimant had rejected the former rate, knew services continued and did not stop them when it reasonably could. The law did not require advance written notice of the precise higher rate as a condition of pleading free acceptance. Whether free acceptance is part of the injustice inquiry or relates to subjective valuation was left for trial.
5. Disposition. The appeal was allowed on all grounds, and the defendant’s grounds in its respondent’s notice were dismissed.

1. High Court (King’s Bench Division): Appeal allowed on all grounds; the respondent’s grounds were dismissed. [2026] EWHC 1672 (KB) .
2. Deputy Master Charles Bagot KC: By judgment dated 31 October 2025, struck out the unjust enrichment claim, entered summary judgment for the defendant and awarded costs. The judgment citation is not stated in the judgment.