Marie-Claire Di Mambro, R (on the application of) v East Devon District Council

Under paragraph W(11) of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015, timely written notice of prior approval is a true alternative to deemed consent. If that notice is later quashed, its legal effect is removed, but the historical fact of timely notification is not erased. A remittal for redetermination re-engages the statutory procedure and does not retrospectively trigger deemed consent. If the definitional requirements of a permitted-development class are not met, no permitted-development rights accrue. Human Rights Act damages and other remedies also require a Convention breach, an actionable civil-rights interest and properly pleaded loss.

The claimant successfully challenged a local planning authority’s prior-approval decision concerning a proposed Class R change of use. By consent, the decision was quashed and the application was remitted for redetermination. The court then considered the claimant’s requests for a declaration, damages, mandatory or injunctive relief and a declaration of incompatibility.

The central issue was whether timely notification of prior approval, later quashed, meant that the deemed-consent rule in paragraph W(11)(c) of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015 had been triggered, and whether any additional remedy followed.

Disposition. The claim for additional remedies was refused. No further order was made on remedy or costs; each represented party was left to bear its own costs.

1. Deemed consent. Paragraph W(11) contains three true alternatives. Timely receipt of written notice granting prior approval under paragraph W(11)(b) displaced the deemed-consent alternative in paragraph W(11)(c). A later quashing order did not retrospectively turn timely action into a failure to notify. The facts were materially different from Coventry Gliding Club Ltd v Harborough District Council and another [2020] EWHC 3388 (Admin) and R. (Nunn) v First Secretary of State and T-Mobile (UK) Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 101, which concerned late or absent notification.
2. Ultra vires and history. A quashed decision may have no continuing legal effect, but the doctrine of ultra vires does not require the court to pretend that the decision or its timely receipt never occurred. That conclusion was supported by Boddington v British Transport Police [1999] 2 AC 143, R. v Soneji [2005] UKHL 49 and R. (Majera) v Home Secretary [2021] UKSC 46, including the values of legal certainty and orderly administration.
3. Effect of the January Order. The remittal for redetermination had to be construed in context. Paragraph 3 re-engaged paragraph W(11), giving the Council a fresh 56-day period or an agreed extension. It therefore left no basis for deemed consent on the original expiry date. The order was construed according to the approach in GFH Capital Ltd v Haigh [2024] EWCA CIV 65, with reference to Sans Souci Ltd v VRL Services Ltd [2012] UKPC 6 and Pan Petroleum AJE Ltd v Yinka Folawiyo Petroleum Company Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 1525.
4. Interpretation and human rights. The ordinary meaning and purpose of the legislation did not support importing a requirement that paragraph W(11)(b) involve a valid decision. The section 3 interpretive obligation under the Human Rights Act 1998 was not needed. A declaration of incompatibility under section 4 was unavailable because the GPDO was not required by the primary legislation.
5. Class R requirements. The Council had to determine on redetermination whether the Class R headline requirements were met. If they were not, no permitted-development rights could accrue and deemed consent could not grant planning permission outside the permitted-development class. The court could not assume those factual and planning matters.
6. Article 6 and damages. A local planning authority is not itself an independent and impartial tribunal, but the composite procedure including judicial review can satisfy Article 6. The Council’s unlawful decision therefore did not itself constitute a breach of section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998. The claimant’s remote interest was also too tenuous to engage civil rights or victim status. Any HRA damages claim would in any event require proper pleading and particularisation.

The judgment describes a prior consent order sealed on 8 January 2026. That order quashed the planning decision, remitted the prior-approval application for redetermination and reserved the issue of additional remedies and costs. This judgment determined the reserved issue; it was not an appeal.