Lloyds Developments Limited v Accor S.A

On an application made before the service period expires, the court has discretion under CPR r 7.6 to extend time for serving a claim form. Inability to serve within the prescribed period is not a bright-line precondition, but the claimant must ordinarily show a good reason relating to difficulties in effecting service. The discretion is exercised in accordance with the overriding objective and the defendant’s right to rely on limitation is a factor of considerable importance. A claimant cannot rely merely on delay of its own making, the general difficulties of overseas service, or the desirability of aligning pleadings in related proceedings. Where limitation is disputed, the normal course is to refuse the extension and leave the issue to fresh proceedings. Material non-disclosure on a without-notice application may independently justify setting aside the extension.

The claimant issued proceedings alleging deceit, unlawful means conspiracy and inducing breach of contract arising from events in 2019. As the defendant was domiciled in France, permission was required for service out of the jurisdiction. Waksman J granted permission and extended the service deadline from 20 June 2025 to 19 September 2025. The claim form and Particulars of Claim were served on 18 September 2025.

The defendant applied to set aside the extension and sought a declaration that the court had no jurisdiction. The issues were whether there was sufficient justification for extending time and whether the claimant had failed to disclose that the extension would, or might, deprive the defendant of a limitation defence.

1. The extension was set aside and the court declared that it had no jurisdiction to try the claim. The service period for a claim form served out of the jurisdiction was six months under CPR r 7.5(2).
2. The application was a rehearing, rather than a review, of the earlier decision. Under CPR r 7.6, an application made before expiry of the service period was not subject to an express requirement that the claimant prove inability to serve. The discretion nevertheless had to be exercised in accordance with the overriding objective.
3. The claimant had not shown a good reason. Its delay in finalising related pleadings, delay in seeking permission to serve out, failure to act promptly after learning that English service would not be accepted, and vague reliance on translation and foreign-service uncertainties were matters substantially within its control. The need to mirror pleadings in related proceedings could have been addressed by serving the claim form and amending later. Difficulties which might justify extending time for Particulars of Claim did not necessarily justify extending time for the claim form.
4. The expiry of the primary limitation period in August 2025 was a potent factor against extension. The claimant relied on section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980, but whether deliberate concealment occurred and when the claimant knew or ought to have known the relevant facts required evidence and detailed examination. The court therefore declined to resolve the limitation dispute on the extension application.
5. The claimant had also failed to make full and accurate disclosure. It should have explained that the proposed extension would run beyond the primary limitation period and provided the basis for reliance on section 32. Although the omission was not deliberate, it caused the court to approach the application on a false or incomplete basis and would independently have required the extension to be set aside.

The judgment concerns an application to set aside an extension of time granted by Waksman J. No appellate history is stated.