Case details
Summary
Police officers do not ordinarily owe an actionable common-law duty to individual victims to prevent loss caused by criminals. Foreseeability is insufficient. The claimant must show a special relationship or other feature establishing proximity.
A 999 burglar-alarm message, without an agreement imposing contractual obligations, does not place its sender in a materially different position from any other person reporting an actual or imminent crime. Public-policy concerns about defensive policing and the diversion of police resources independently preclude the proposed negligence duty.
Factual background
The claimant operated a clothing shop protected by a burglar alarm which sent a recorded 999 message to the police. The alarm sounded, but the shop was later found burgled and its stock removed.
Hodgson J held that a police officer had failed to inspect the rear of the premises after discovering that the internal alarm had stopped. He found that the failure had caused the loss and that the police owed the shopkeeper a duty of care. Damages had been agreed at £7,500, subject to liability.
The Chief Constable appealed. The central issue was whether police officers owed a private-law duty of care to a person whose premises were the subject of a burglar-alarm call, where the loss was caused by burglars.
Held
Appeal allowed unanimously. Lord Justice Glidewell, with whose conclusion Lord Justice Slade agreed and Lord Justice Parker concurred, held that the police owed no duty of care of the proposed kind.
Where the immediate loss is caused by a criminal, reasonable foreseeability does not itself create a duty to prevent it. Following the approach in Dorset Yacht [1970] AC 1004 and Hill [1989] AC 53, a claimant must show a special relationship or other feature establishing the necessary proximity.
The burglar-alarm connection did not supply that feature. There was no agreement under which the police had assumed contractual obligations. The claimant's position was no different in principle from that of any person who reports by 999 that a crime against person or property is occurring or imminent. Such a report could not create a tortious duty owed to every dissatisfied caller.
Public policy provided an independent reason for denying the duty. The policy considerations stated in Hill were general and not confined to investigation of crimes already committed. Potential negligence claims would risk defensive policing and divert police time and resources from suppressing crime.
Lord Justice Glidewell would have upheld the judge's causal finding if a duty had existed. Lord Justice Parker would also have allowed the appeal because the evidence did not justify an inference that a timely rear inspection would have prevented the theft. Lord Justice Slade left that factual issue open. No common appellate determination on causation was necessary because the duty-of-care issue disposed of the appeal.
The court’s approach to earlier authorities
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Appellate history
Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal allowed in [1990] EWCA Civ 19. The judgment for the claimant was set aside because no common-law duty of care was owed.
High Court, Queen's Bench Division, Liverpool District Registry: Hodgson J gave judgment for the claimant on 17 February 1989, holding that the police owed a duty of care and that its breach caused the agreed loss.
Lower court decision
Key cases cited
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