R (A) v Lambeth London Borough Council

A needs assessment under section 17(1) of the Children Act 1989 does not convert the authority’s general duty to provide an appropriate range and level of children’s services into a specific duty, enforceable by the individual child, to meet every assessed need.

The majority further held that section 17 is not directed to the provision of alternative residential accommodation for a child living with a parent able and willing to accommodate the child. Such housing needs are addressed by the accommodation provisions in Part III of the Act and by the statutory housing schemes. Section 17 decisions remain subject to ordinary public-law review.

The appellant was the mother of two autistic boys with severe learning difficulties. Social-work assessments identified a need for suitable accommodation and support, but the family remained in an unsuitable two-bedroom council flat. Her practical objective was a transfer within the council’s housing-transfer scheme.

Scott Baker J dismissed her application for judicial review on 25 May 2001. She appealed, contending that once the council had assessed the children’s needs, section 17 of the Children Act 1989 imposed a concrete and enforceable duty to provide suitable alternative accommodation.

The central question was whether an assessment under section 17 caused the authority’s general children’s-services duty to crystallise into an individual duty to meet the assessed housing need.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. The court upheld Scott Baker J’s dismissal of the judicial-review claim.

2. Lord Justice Laws held that section 17(1) of the Children Act 1989 imposed a general or target duty. Its wide language required an authority to provide an appropriate range and level of services for children in need. It did not establish a two-stage scheme under which an assessment of a particular child’s needs created a specific, individually enforceable obligation to meet them. Lord Justice Chadwick expressly agreed with that reasoning as an alternative basis for dismissing the appeal.

3. Lord Justice Chadwick, with whom Sir Philip Otton agreed, held that section 17 was not directed to providing residential accommodation for a child who remained in a family unit with a parent willing and able to provide accommodation. The more specific provisions in sections 20 to 23 of the Act addressed children who were effectively without family accommodation or whose welfare required separation from the family unit.

4. The majority held that family housing needs of this kind were to be addressed through the housing legislation, including the authority’s transfer policies and allocation scheme under the Housing Act 1996. Section 17 could not be used to circumvent the statutory allocation of scarce housing resources.

5. Laws LJ considered that section 17 probably did confer a power to provide accommodation as assistance in kind, but this was not the majority view and was unnecessary to the result. Guidance issued under section 7 of the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970 could not create an enforceable duty which the statute itself did not impose.

6. The absence of a specific individual duty did not place the authority beyond judicial review. It remained subject to ordinary public-law requirements, including rationality, procedural fairness where applicable, and the prohibition on fettering discretion.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal dismissed in [2001] EWCA Civ 1624.
• High Court: Scott Baker J dismissed the appellant’s application for judicial review on 25 May 2001.