R C Pillar & Son v The Camber

Parties may confer or widen an adjudicator’s jurisdiction by agreement, including through their pleadings and conduct. A party that advances substantial cross-claims for determination, and whose opponent responds to those claims on their merits while waiving procedural objections, may be taken to have agreed to an ad hoc adjudication covering all claims and cross-claims.

A letter of intent can constitute a binding construction contract sufficiently evidenced in writing where it identifies the work and price and incorporates standard contractual terms. Missing entries in an incorporated standard-form appendix do not necessarily prevent contractual effect. A developed dispute existed where both parties had advanced and answered substantive claims before the adjudicator’s appointment.

R C Pillar & Son sought summary judgment to enforce an adjudicator’s award requiring The Camber to pay a net sum of £46,000. Camber raised several jurisdictional defences, including the alleged absence of a contract, insufficient written evidence under section 107 of the Housing, Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996, reliance on the IFC standard form, replacement of the original arrangement by an alleged oral contract, and the absence of a dispute when the adjudication began.

The judge identified a preliminary issue: whether the parties’ pleadings and conduct amounted to an agreement conferring ad hoc jurisdiction on the adjudicator to determine both parties’ claims, without reliance on withholding-notice objections.

1. Ad hoc jurisdiction. The court held that Camber’s detailed cross-claims were a clear offer to widen the adjudication so that the adjudicator would determine Camber’s positive monetary claims as well as Pillar’s claims. Pillar accepted that offer by expressly waiving reliance on the absence of withholding notices, responding in detail to the cross-claims, and permitting the adjudicator to determine all issues on their merits. The parties therefore agreed to an ad hoc adjudication covering all claims and cross-claims. Camber’s original jurisdictional objection was conditional and was withdrawn by that agreement.
2. Written contract. The judge additionally concluded, obiter, that the letter of intent identified sufficient contractual subject matter and price. It incorporated the relevant payment provisions of the IFC 1998 standard form. The fact that blanks remained in the appendix did not prevent the incorporated terms from taking effect. The resulting collection of documents was sufficiently certain and sufficiently evidenced in writing to constitute a construction contract capable of supporting statutory adjudication under section 107 of the Housing, Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996.
3. Alleged March 2004 contract. The judge declined to reach conclusions on the suggested later oral contract. The evidence did not establish a triable issue, and a trial would have been speculative.
4. Existence of a dispute. The finding was also obiter, but the court considered that the developed claims and cross-claims constituted a dispute when the adjudicator was appointed.
5. Pillar was entitled to summary judgment for the sum awarded by the adjudicator.